Volume 117

Issue 3

Article 17

April 2015

Coping with a New "Yellow Peril": Japanese Immigration, the
Gentleman's Agreement, and the Coming of World War II
Paul Finkelman
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Law and
Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul Finkelman, Coping with a New "Yellow Peril": Japanese Immigration, the Gentleman's Agreement, and
the Coming of World War II, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. (2015).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/17

This 2015 Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College
of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an
authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Finkelman: Coping with a New "Yellow Peril": Japanese Immigration, the Gentl

COPING WITH A NEW "YELLOW PERIL":
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION, THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT,
AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II
Paul Finkelman*

I.

IN TRO DU CTION .................................................................................... 1409

II.

EARLY OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION IN A CONTINENT OF
IMM IG RAN TS .....................................................................................
HOSTILITY TO IMMIGRATION FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL

III.

14 12

WA R .............................................................
14 15
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.

HOSTILITY TO EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS, 1880-1924 ......................... 1420
EAST A SIAN IMMIGRATION ................................................................. 1421
THE NEW YELLOW PERIL: JAPANESE IMMIGRATION .......................... 1426
THE RISE OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT, SCHOOL SEGREGATION
IN SAN FRANCISCO, AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT .............................. 1432
TOWARD RESTRICTION AND EXCLUSION ............................................ 1444
THE DIPLOMATIC IMPACT OF THE BAN ON JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 1446
THE ULTIMATE COSTS OF ANTI-JAPANESE POLICY ............................ 1451

I.

INTRODUCTION

Immigration, both legal and illegal, has been a divisive political issue
in the United States for the last two decades.' This is hardly a new

*
Senior Fellow, Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism,
University of Pennsylvania and Scholar-in-Residence, National Constitution Center,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I wrote portions of this Article while I was a visiting scholar at the
Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University in 2012. I thank Gabriel J. Chin, Roger
Daniels, William Rhee, and Rogers Smith for their comments and help; my former research
assistant Lauren L. Hunt; and the brilliant librarians at Albany Law School: Bob Emery, Leslie
Cunningham, Rebecca Murphy, and Colleen Ostiguy. I presented portions of this paper at the
2015 MAPOC Conference and thank the participants at that conference for their comments. I
presented a draft of this Article at a workshop at the Race and Justice in America symposium
sponsored by The Mudd Center for Ethics at Washington and Lee University, and I thank
Margaret Hu, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Alfred Brophy, Joshua Sellers, Dianne Pinderhughes, and
Justin Weinstein-Tull for their comments and suggestions. Portions of this Article appeared as
Race, Federalism,and Diplomacy: The Gentlemen's Agreement a Century Later, 56 OSAKA U. L.
REv. 1 (2009) (Japan).
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phenomenon, although many commentators and politicians seem oblivious to
the nation's long history of hostility to newcomers, especially those who are
"different" in some way. The irony of this, of course, is that the United States is
a nation of immigrants with greater religious and ethnic diversity than any other
nation.
An understanding of the periodic movements against immigration puts
the current debates in perspective. This history also illustrates that sometimes
the consequences of hostility to immigration can have long-reaching effects.
This Article focuses on the movement to stop Japanese immigration a century
ago, leading to the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. 3 Particularly important
were discriminatory state laws and court decisions, as well as aggressive and
racist rhetoric by state officials, which undermined American foreign policy. In
the early 20th century, when California went out of its way to persecute
Japanese immigrants and their American-born children, the Hartford Times
[Connecticut] quipped that "of the two, it might be cheaper to go to war with
California than with Japan."' 4 In fact, the myriad of anti-Japanese laws passed
in California and elsewhere, 5 combined with America's insulting federal policy

I

Immigration reform was accomplished with the bipartisan Simpson-Mazolli Act of 1986,

which depoliticized immigration for about ten years. Immigration issues reemerged in the 1990s
as a huge political issue. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
2
See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: 2012 tbl. 3
(2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/
yearbook/2012/LPR/table3d.xls. Between 2003 and 2012 about ten million people, from more
than 200 countries-virtually every country in the world-moved to the United States. Id.
3
There is no formal or official text of this agreement. See Raymond Leslie Buell, The
Development of the Anti-JapaneseAgitation in the United States, PartI, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 605, 631
(1922). The best early statement of it can be found in correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Hanihara to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. See 65 CONG. REc. 6073-74 (1924). In
1939, the State Department published 80 pages of documents on United States-Japanese relations
from 1924 that included most of the memoranda that constituted the agreement of 1908. DEP'T OF
STATE, Japan: Restriction of Japanese Immigration by Act of Congress, and the Abrogation of
the Gentlemen 's Agreement, in 2 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1924 at 333-421 (1939), available at http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/
1924v02/reference/frus.frusl924v2.i001 .pdf. The best place to start in the study of the issue is
ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA

AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 31-45 (1962) [hereinafter POLITICS OF PREJUDICE].
4
ALLAN R. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 38 (1967).
5
For example, all three Pacific coast states as well as Arizona and Idaho attempted to
prevent Japanese immigrants from owning land or engaging in certain businesses. See generally
Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to
Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998); Dudley 0. McGovney, The Anti-JapaneseLand Laws of
California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 7 (1947). On access to professions and
business, see In re Takuji Yamashita, 70 P. 482 (Wash. 1902) (denying an otherwise qualified
applicant the right to practice law in Washington State on the grounds that Japanese bom
immigrants could not be citizens of the United States, and the State of Washington made
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on Japanese immigration, starting with the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908,
and culminating with the virtual ban on Japanese immigration after 1924,6
helped set the stage for the ultimate collapse of United States-Japanese
relations in the 1930s and the war with Japan from 1941 to 1945. As the United
States celebrates the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, it is worth
considering whether our irrational and racist immigration policies helped lead
to the carnage of the Pacific theater in the War. We might further consider how
state laws that are overtly hostile to immigrants affect foreign policy and
national security, which constitutionally should be entirely in the hands of the
federal government.
Most of this Article focuses on Japanese immigration and the
Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. However, Sections I through IV offer brief
histories of hostility to immigration in earlier periods. Section I offers a brief
examination of hostility to immigration in the colonial period. Section II takes
us from the Revolution to the end of the Civil War. Section III offers a very
brief look at the growing hostility to immigration from southern and eastern
Europe and from the Middle East in the period of mass immigration, from 1880
to 1924, when the United States did its best to close off immigration from
everywhere but western Europe. This section briefly notes the catastrophic
human costs of this policy, which prevented refugees from Nazism finding
sanctuary in the United States in the 1930s and early 1940s. From Section IV to
the end of this Article I look at immigration from China and Japan, focusing
most of my attention in Sections V through IX on the process of restricting and
ending Japanese immigration to the United States. While Americans focus on a
crisis of immigration today, this Article reminds us that hostility to immigration

citizenship a prerequisite for admission to the bar; not all states had such a requirement); see also
In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P. 156 (Cal. 1890) (stating that California would not admit a Chinese
immigrant to the bar even though he had been admitted to practice in New York). In 1943,
California also prohibited Japanese immigrants from obtaining commercial fishing licenses. See
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (overturning California law denying
commercial fishing licenses to "persons ineligible for citizenship," which applied almost entirely
to Japanese born aliens). The State of Washington prohibited aliens who had not declared their
intention to become citizens-which meant Asians who could not become citizens-from
owning firearms, obtaining hunting licenses, becoming public school teachers, or engaging in
commercial fishing. For other discriminatory laws aimed at Japanese and Chinese immigrants,
see PAULI MURRAY, STATES' LAW ON RACE AND COLOR (1951).
6
In 1924, the United States set quotas on foreign immigrants. Immigration Act of 1924, ch.
190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed 1952). The quota for Japanese immigrants was "zero"-that is
no new immigrants could come into the United States from Japan. However, the law did allow
wives, children, and parents of American residents and citizens to enter the country. From 1924
until 1941, a total of about 6,300 Japanese entered the United States. This contrasts with the
8,801 Japanese immigrants who entered just in the year 1924, before the quota system went into
effect, or the 30,226 who entered the year before the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 58 (1960) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS], available at

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/ publications/histstatus/hstat_1957_cen_ 1957.pdf.
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is not new, but it has a long history. Indeed, this Article suggests that hostility
to immigrants is as American as apple pie-but, sadly, it is a pie made with the
classic American crab apple.
II.

EARLY OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION IN A CONTINENT OF IMMIGRANTS

One of the earliest recorded complaints about new immigrants to
America is the outburst that Governor William Bradford of the Plymouth
Colony recorded in his diary in 1642. Bradford complained that the population
was being corrupted by recent immigrants who were "wicked persons and
profane people," who had "so quickly come over into this land and mix[ed]
themselves amongst"7 the "religious men" who "began" the colony and "came
for religion's sake.",
Bradford was responding to the recent execution for bestiality of
Thomas Granger, a 16- or 17-year-old servant. 8 When asked where he learned
this immoral behavior, Granger "said he was taught it by another that had heard
of such things from some in England when he was there, and they kept cattle
together." 9 Thus, Bradford blamed Granger's fatal deviant behavior on recent
immigrants who had corrupted the young teenager.'0 Bradford also noted that
another young man who had recently been executed for sodomy "confessed he
had long used it in old England."" Bradford concluded that this illustrated how
even "one wicked person may infect many" and urged residents to be careful of
"what servants they bring into their families."' 2
Bradford explained that the wrong kind of people were coming to the
colony, in part because there was a shortage of labor and because many settlers,
in desperate need of farm hands and servants, "were glad to take such as they3
hired. 1
could," without regard to the religiosity or character of the people they
He also observed that, because "so many godly disposed persons" were
"willing to come into these parts," some men in England "began to make a
trade of it, to transport passengers and their goods, and hired ships for that

OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-1647, at 321 (Samuel Eliot
Morison ed., 1952).
Thomas Granger was tried and executed after he was "detected of buggery, and indicted
8
for the same, with a mare, a cow, two goats, five sheep, two calves, and a turkey." Id. at 320.
Morison's edition modernizes punctuation and spelling. For an exact transcript of Bradford's
7

WILLIAM BRADFORD,

diary, see BRADFORD'S

HISTORY "OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION"

474 (1898),

available at

http://faculty.gordon.edu/hulbi/ted-hildebrandt/nereligioushistory/bradford-plimoth/bradfordplymouthplantation.pdf
9

OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-1647, supra note 7, at 320-21.

10

II

Id.
Id. at 321.

12

Id.

13

Id.
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end." 14 But once these businesses were started, the entrepreneurs, "to make up
their freight and advance their profit, cared not who the persons were" they
transported to Plymouth, as long as "they had money to pay them."' 5 "And by
this means the country became pestered with 16many unworthy persons who,
being come over, crept into one place or other."
Thus, as early as 1642, authorities in the Plymouth colony blamed
social problems on unwanted immigrants: in Granger's case, a fellow
Englishman whose religious convictions and personal behavior were not
exactly in tune with the founders of the colony. The source of these dangerous
aliens was capitalist entrepreneurs who brought over the "wrong" kind of
immigrants because it was profitable to do. But, the problem was also caused
by local residents, who were otherwise pious and moral citizens, but who were
nevertheless willing to hire laborers without regard to their provenance or their
religious values. 17 As Bradford noted in his diary, the desire to come to
America, the profits from transporting them, and the willingness of upright
citizens to hire these undesirable aliens were, in Bradford's mind, combining to
destroy the moral fiber of the new colony.' 8
Bradford was not the only colonial official to oppose the immigration
of strangers. In the Dutch colony of New Netherland (what is today New
York), Governor-General Petrus Stuyvesant persecuted Quakers, Jews, and
Lutherans, persistently arguing that ethnic and religious diversity would
undermine the stability of the community. 19 Officials of the Dutch West Indies
Company, who were based in Holland, would not allow Stuyvesant to expel the
Quakers and Jews, but they did support his decision to deport a Lutheran
minister. 20 The leaders of the colony believed that a Lutheran minister in New
Netherland "would tend to the injury of our [Dutch Reformed] church, the

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17 Id. at 541. This of course resembles modem America where otherwise law abiding citizens
(as well as citizens less scrupulous about legalities) hire undocumented aliens. See KEvN R.
JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS To RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND

IMMIGRATION LAWS, 177 (2007) ("[T]he ordinary law-abiding citizen does not consider the

employment of undocumented workers to be truly criminal conduct. Many U.S. citizens,
including several otherwise upstanding nominees for high-level cabinet positions, knowingly
hired undocumented immigrants.").
18 OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-1647, supra note 7, at 320-21.
19
Paul Finkelman, Toleration and Diversity in New Netherlandand the Duke's Colony: The
Roots of America's First Disestablishment, in No ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA'S
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 125, 131-37 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr.
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Finkelman, Toleration and Diversity], available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID2209182-code547065 .pdfabstractid=2169919&mirid = 1.
20
Id.
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diminution of hearers of the Word of God, and the increase of dissensions.""
They feared it would "pave the way for other sects, so that in time our place
would become a receptacle for all sorts of heretics and fanatics. 2 They
believed that Quakers, Jews, Lutherans, and anyone else who was not Dutch
Reformed, or at least Dutch, was a threat to the peace and stability of the
colony.23 In the end, the Directors of the West Indies Company allowed these
foreigners to remain in New Netherland, because the colony needed settlers,
even if they were not Dutch and had aberrant religious views.24 Thus, the New
Netherland colony became the most diverse and polyglot settlement in the New
World, but that was over the objections of the Dutch leaders
residing in the
25
colony, who generally opposed all "foreign" immigration.
Between the British acquisition of the New Netherland colony in 1664
and the eve of the American Revolution, there was substantial voluntary
immigration into the colonies that would make up the United States.2 6 Most
immigrants came from Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland),
and most were Protestants. There were, of course, many people of Dutch
ancestry in what became New York. The largest non-British immigration was
from Germany. Non-British immigrants were generally allowed free access to
the colonies, birthright citizenship was generally accorded to their children,
and, after 1740, naturalization was possible for non-British immigrants who
were not Catholic. 27 This law encouraged non-British immigrants to come to

21

1 ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS: STATE OF NEW YORK 317 (Hugh Hastings ed., 1901) (quoting

correspondence from Revs. Megapolensis and Drisius to the Classis of Amsterdam dated Oct. 6,
1653), availableat https://archive.org/streaniecclesiasticalresO1 newy#page/316/mode/2up.
22
Id.
23
Their fears were both religious and ethnic. Thus, the New Netherland officials were
unconcerned when a few Dutch Jews came to the colony, apparently because their connections to
Holland neutralized any threat posed by their religion. But, the officials were horrified when
Portuguese Jews arrived. See Finkelman, Tolerationand Diversity,supra note 19, at 139.
24
Paul Finkelman, "A Land That Needs Peoplefor Its Increase": How the Jews Won the
Right To Remain in New Netherland, in NEW ESSAYS IN AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY 19 (Pamela
S. Nadell et al. eds., 2010).
25
Id.
26
See Assessing the Slave Trade: Estimates, VOYAGES: THE TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE
http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces (last visited Apr. 10,
2015). There was also, of course, substantial involuntary immigration for African slaves. Id.
From 1619 to 1775, traders brought about 125,000 slaves to what became the 13 colonies. Id.
This included about 104,000 directly from African and about 20,000 who were brought from the
Caribbean islands. Id. This is based on the exhaustive international research project, which has
examined records (especially tax and shipping records) in Europe and America to map the
African slave trade. See id. I thank Professor David Richardson at the University of Hull in the
United Kingdom for help with this data.
27
Naturalization Act, 1739, 13 Geo. 3, c. 7 (Eng.) ("An Act for naturalizing such foreign
Protestants, and others therein mentioned, as are settled or shall settle, in any of his Majesty's
DATABASE,
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the colonies and helped set the stage for a liberal immigration policy during and
immediately after the Revolution. 8
III. HOSTILITY TO IMMIGRATION FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

Revolutionary America welcomed freedom-seeking immigrants.
Indeed, one of the specific complaints against King George III listed in the
Declaration of Independence was: "He has endeavored to prevent the
population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their
migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. 2 9
Europeans who came to support the patriot cause were welcomed during the
War, and many, such as Marquis de Lafayette, were granted citizenship. 30 In
passing, it is worth noting that the current hostility to allowing citizenship for
millions of immigrants to the United States violates the principles of the
American Revolution and the principle of the patriots who participated in the
first political "tea party" in America, in Boston Harbor in December 1773.
After the Revolution, the new nation was initially receptive to
immigration as well. 31 Before the adoption of the new Constitution, the states
passed their own naturalization laws. Except for bans on the importation of
African slaves,3 2 none of the new states passed any limitations on immigration.
The new Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate naturalization but
prohibited Congress from passing any laws restricting immigration until
1808. 33 While Congress could not ban or even limit immigration until 1808, it
Colonies in America"). The "others" mentioned and allowed to be naturalized were Quakers and
Jews.
28

See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-

1870, at 74-105, 173-247 (1978); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIvic IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 54-59,71-76 (1997).

29
30

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
For background information about the Marquis de Lafayette, see Stanley J. ldzerda,

Lafayette, Marquis de, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, available at http://www.anb.org/
articles/03/03-00266.html.
31
SMITH, supra note 28, at 92-98.
32
See Paul Finkelman, The American Suppression of the African Slave Trade: Lessons on
Legal Change, Social Policy, and Legislation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 431, 433-67 (2009)
[hereinafter Finkelman, The American Suppression].
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." Id. This clause is correctly known as the
"Slave Trade" clause, and was at the heart of the most vitriolic debates at the Constitutional
Convention, because through it the Constitution sanctioned the African slave trade. See PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 22-32
(2014). The clause prevented the federal government from ending the African slave trade until
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could regulate naturalization 34 and the status of immigrants in the nation. In
1798, Congress passed a series of "alien" laws to make it more difficult for
newcomers to become citizens and easier for the national government to expel
them. Setting a pattern that would be repeated in the future, the Federalists in
Congress believed that immigrants were a threat to national security because
too many were sympathetic to France during the Napoleonic Wars. 36 In
addition, most new citizens seemed to be gravitating to the party of Thomas
Jefferson, and thus slowing down naturalization was seen as a way of
protecting Federalist political power. 7 Followers of Jefferson were correct in
believing that "the Federalists were conniving to use citizenship laws to deny
their opponents [the Jeffersonsonians] access to office. 38 From the 1820s to
the Civil War, there were various waves of anti-immigration sentiment. In the
1820s, New York attempted to regulate the arrival of poor immigrants-mostly
Irish Catholics-through a registration process.39 When the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld this statute in Mayor of New York v. Miln,4 ° the
majority opinion noted that it was "obviously passed with a view to prevent her
citizens from being oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons,
who come from foreign countries without possessing the means of supporting
themselves.'
In Miln, the Court developed the concept of "state police
powers," which allowed states to protect themselves from undesirable migrants,
42
whether they were poor Irish immigrants coming to New York or free blacks
entering the slave state of South Carolina.4 3 Thus, Justice Philip P. Barbour
concluded,
1808. Id. But the clause also prevented the national government from regulating immigration
("migration") until 1808, and left that entirely to the states. Id.
34 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o establish
an
uniform Rule of Naturalization ....
").
35 Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (establishing a uniform rule of
naturalization); Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (concerning aliens); Act of July
6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (concerning enemy aliens).
36
See generallyJAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1966).

37
38

Id.; SMITH, supra note 28, at 160-63.
SMITH, supranote 28, at 161.

39 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 130 (1837) (referencing the "act concerning
passengers in vessels arriving in the port of New York").
40
36 U.S. 102 (1837).
41

Id. at 141.

For a discussion of the slavery aspects of this case, see Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery
in American ConstitutionalLaw, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261,266,275-76 (2000).
43 Much of the argument of counsel in this case centered on the right of South Carolina and
other slave states to prohibit free blacks from moving to, or even entering, their jurisdiction. The
42

arguments focused on what were known as Black Seamen's Laws, which allowed for the

temporary incarceration of free black sailors whose ships docked in slave states. While clearly a
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We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of
paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard
against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound
and infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of
which may be labouring under an infectious disease. 4
Thus, regulating poor immigrants--especially Irish Catholics-was the moral
equivalent of preventing a "pestilence" from coming into the country.
A decade later, at the beginning of a new wave of anti-immigrant
political activity, the Court overturned laws from New York and
Massachusetts, which taxed immigrants, on the grounds that these taxes
violated the dormant powers of Congress. 45 However, the laws themselves
illustrated the growing hostility to immigrants, especially Catholics from
Ireland and Germany. In the 1840s, opponents of Catholic immigration
organized the North American Party, which was also called the American
Republican Party and later called the Native American Party. In 1844, the
party's candidates won the mayor's races in New York and Philadelphia, and
won a few seats in Congress, but also hurt some politicians like Millard
Fillmore, who probably lost the governor's race in New York because of his
support for the party. 46 In the mid-1850s, the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic
American Party, more commonly known as the Know-Nothing Party, had
fleeting success, sending more than 50 candidates to Congress in 1854
(including the entire Massachusetts delegation); taking control of some state
legislatures (including 397 out of 400 seats in the Massachusetts assembly);
electing govemors in Massachusetts, Maine, and Pennsylvania; and winning
races for mayor in Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. 47 In 1856, the
former president Millard Fillmore, running on the Know-Nothing Party, carried

violation of the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § I, cl. 3), federal courts ducked the issue
because it was too politically sensitive for them to rule on it. See, e.g., Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8
F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). For a discussion of the "Black Seamen's Laws," see
Paul Finkelman, States' Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125, 125-58 (Kermit L. Hall &
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
44
Miln, 36 U.S. at 142-43.
45
See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
46
PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE 11 (2011).
47
SMITH, supra note 28, at 210-11. The literature on the Know-Nothings and nativists is rich.
See generally DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST MOVEMENTS TO THE NEW
RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1988); TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE
NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850s (1992) (discussing the KnowNothings); Stephen E. Maizlish, The Meaning of Nativism and the Crisis of the Union: The

Know-Nothing Movement in the Antebellum North, in

ESSAYS ON AMERICAN ANTEBELLUM

POLITICS, 1840-1860, at 166 (Stephen E. Maizlish & John J. Kushma ed., 1982).
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one state, Maryland, as the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic candidate for
president, but that was the end of the movement.4 8
Despite the persistent hostility to immigrants-especially towards
those who were different because of their faith, language, or appearance-most
Americans tolerated or even welcomed immigrants. They provided inexpensive
labor and helped to populate the large and mostly empty nation in the 19th
century. While New York and Massachusetts tried to limit immigration (with
virtually no success), some midwestern and western states tried to encourage
immigrants to populate their empty lands. 49 The politics of immigration
mattered throughout the 1850s, as both major parties-the Democrats and the
new Republican Party-competed for the votes of the foreign born, as the
Know-Nothings ran on their anti-Catholic and anti-immigration platform. After
the demise of the Know-Nothings, most supporters of that party migrated to the
Republican Party, where they unsuccessfully pushed their anti-immigrant
agenda. ° Most Republican leaders rejected such xenophobia as impolitic and
contrary to the emerging Republican views about equality for all Americans. 5 1
In 1855, with the Know-Nothing Party at its apex, Abraham Lincoln, the leader
of the new Republican Party in Illinois, wrote a friend:
I am not a Know-Nothing. That is certain. How could I be?
How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in
favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in
degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation, we
began by declaring that "all men are created equal." We now
practically read it "all men are created equal, except negroes."
When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read "all men are
created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and catholics."
When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some
country where they make no pretence of loving liberty-to
Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and
without the base alloy of hypocracy.5 2
Five years later, Lincoln would be elected president and be forced to
lead the nation in an enormously bloody and expensive war to preserve the

48

MILLARD FILLMORE, supra note 46, at 128, 133-34.

49

See Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING
OF

MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW

50

2-4 (1995).

William E. Gienapp, Nativism and the Creation of a Republican Majority in the North

Before the Civil War, 72 J. AM. HIST. 529, 531 (1985); see also WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE
ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856 (1987).
51
Angela M. Alexander, "All Men are CreatedEqual": Abraham Lincoln, Immigration, and
Ethnicity, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 803, 804 (2010).
52
Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln to Joshua Speed, Aug. 24, 1855, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 320, 323 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953)).
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Constitution and the nation. His sympathy towards immigrants paid off, as
more than a half a million foreign-born men would serve in the U.S. Army
during the Civil War, including more than 200,000 from Germany and perhaps
150,000 from Ireland. 53 There were numerous German and Irish brigades and
regiments, as well as units made up of immigrants from Switzerland, Italy,
Poland, and Norway. 54 A number of prominent German immigrants served as
generals, including Major Generals Franz Sigel and Carl Schurz.55 Reflecting
the diversity of America's immigrant culture and the openness of the Lincoln
administration, there were also a number of immigrant Jewish generals,
including Frederick Knefler, Edward Selig Salomon, and Frederick C.
Salomon. 6 Recognizing the recent immigration of Jews from central Europe,
53

PORTLAND STATE UNIV., IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMY DURING THE

CIVIL WAR (n.d.), available at http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IMS/currentprojects/TAHv3/Content/

PDFs/ImmigrantSoldiersCivilWar.pdf;
Irish-Americans
in
the
Civil
War,
CIVILWARHOME.COM, http://civilwarhome.com/irish.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Ethic [sic]
Composition of Civil War Forces, CIVILWARHOME.COM, http://civilwarhome.com/ ethnic.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
See generally MARTIN W. OFELE, TRUE SONS OF THE REPUBLIC: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNION ARMY (2008); GERMANS IN THE CIVIL WAR: THE LETTERS THEY WROTE HOME (Walter
54

D. Kamphoefner & Wolfgang Helbich eds., 2006). For a new discussion of some of the
motivations of German volunteers, see also Mischa Honeck, Men of Principle: Gender and the
German American Warfor the Union, 5 J. CIv. WAR ERA 38 (2015).
55
See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, CARL SCHURZ: A BIOGRAPHY (1982). Schurz came to the United
States in 1852 and was chairman of the Wisconsin delegation at the Republican National
Convention in 1860. He briefly served as U.S. Ambassador to Spain before returning in 1862 to
serve as a general, although his military career was undistinguished. He would later be a U.S.
Senator and Secretary of the Interior. Siegel, who came to the United States in 1852 and had been
an officer in Germany, was even less successful as a major general than Schurz. However, under
the slogan, "I goes to fight mit Sigel," he was very successful at recruiting Germans to join the
army at the beginning of the war. His success even led to one of the more interesting songs of the
war. 97TH REGIMENTAL STRING BAND, I GOES TO FIGHT MIT SIGEL, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-IUSJA-vtgs (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). On Sigel's life and wartime career, see,
STEPHEN D. ENGLE, YANKEE DUTCHMAN: THE LIFE OF FRANZ SIGEL 83 (1999).
56
BERTRAM WALLACE KORN, AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE CIVIL WAR (1951). Knefler was a
Hungarian immigrant who arrived in the United States in 1850 after fighting, at age 15, in the
Revolution of 1848. He enlisted in an Indiana regiment and gradually rose to brevet brigadier
general in March 1865. Id. See generally ROBERT PERLMAN, BRIDGING THREE WORLDS:
HUNGARIAN-JEWISH AMERICANS, 1848-1914 (1991). Edward S. Salomon came from Germany in
1856 and in 1861, at age 24, was elected as an alderman in Chicago. He was commissioned in
Colonel Friedrich Hecker's virtually all-German 24th Illinois Infantry Regiment, displayed great
gallantry at Gettysburg, and rose to brigadier general. After the war, he was the governor of
Washington Territory. Frederick Charles Salomon (no relation to Edward S.) left Germany after
the 1848 Revolution, enlisted in 1861 as a captain under Franz Sigel, and was made a brigadier
general in 1862, and mustered out as brevet major general in 1865. Major General Frederick
Salomon,

TWENTY-EIGHTH

WIS.

VOLUNTEER

INFANTRY,

http://www.28thwisconsin.com/

salomon.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). He had one brother, Charles Eberhard Salomon, who
was made a general after the war ended while his other brother, Edward Salomon (not to be
confused with Edward S. Salomon) was governor of Wisconsin during the War. See Wisconsin's
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the Lincoln administration supported a change in federal law that
allowed for
7
the appointment of Jewish clergy to serve as military chaplains. 1
IV. HOSTILITY TO EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS,

1880-1924

Starting in the 1880s, there was a massive wave of immigration from
Scandinavia, eastern and southern Europe, and the Ottoman Empire, which
dramatically changed the nature of American ethnic culture. These new
immigrants stimulated a rise in anti-Catholic sentiment, anti-Semitism, and
general hostility to open immigration. From the 1890s on, there would be new
movements against immigration, like the American Protective Association, and
various attempts to regulate or limit immigration from Ireland, southern and
eastern Europe, and the Turkish empire. But, despite the waxing and waning of
hostility to European and Middle Eastern immigration, "white '' 58 immigrants59
from these places poured into the United States until after World War I.
These new immigrants faced no legal disabilities, and most were gradually,
although sometimes grudgingly, able to fully participate in American political
and economic culture. The Immigration Act of 192460 reduced immigration
into the United States, and severely limited immigration from eastern and
southern Europe. This law had horrendous and fatal consequences for Jews
trying to flee Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s.61 However, those immigrants and
their children from eastern and southern Europe who were able to enter the
United States were able to attend public schools, buy property, enter
professions, and become citizens.
Thus, when we look at European immigration, it is a mixed bag. Antiimmigrant attitudes and politics burdened some immigrants, especially Irish,
Jews, Italians, and Catholics in general. The immigration restrictions in 1924
Salomon Brothers in the Civil War, SONS OF UNION VETERANS OF THE CIVIL WAR,
http://suvcw.org/past/salomon.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
57
Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 200, 12 Stat. 595 (1862) (defining "the pay and emoluments of

certain officers of the Army, and for other purposes").
58
For a discussion of the slippery and not entirely clear definition of"white" in naturalization
laws, see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).

59

Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed 1952) (an "Act to Limit
the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes").
60

Id.

61

United States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees, 1941-1952, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL

MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Moduled=10007094 (last updated June 20,
2014); see also Holocaust, IMMIGRATION IN AM. (Jan. 16, 2012), http://immigrationin
america.org/552-holocaust.html?newsid=552. The most famous example of this was the ship the
St. Louis, which was not allowed to land in the United States in 1939. SARAH A. OGILVIE &
SCOTT MILLER, REFUGE DENIED: THE ST. LOUIS PASSENGERS AND THE HOLOCAUST

3 (2006). Of

the 908 Jewish passengers on the ship, at least 254 died in the Holocaust. Id. at x, 4; see also
Voyage of the St. Louis, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/
article.php?ModuleId=10005267 (last updated June 20, 2014).
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led to tragic results in the 1930s and 1940s, when the immigration laws and
policies prevented hundreds of thousands of Jewish reftgees escaping German
anti-Semitism from reaching a safe harbor in the United States. But, at the same
time, from the American Revolution to 1924, there had been uninterrupted and
mostly open immigration from Europe and the Middle East. These immigrants
provided soldiers for American armies. In the mid- and late-19th century, they
turned the upper Midwest and Great Plains into farms and provided the labor
that built canals, railroads, subways, and factories. From the late-19th century
to after World War II, these immigrants provided much of the labor that led to
American industrialization. American prosperity after the Civil War was, to a
great extent, possible because of the hard work and energy of millions of
immigrants 62-more than 22 million between 1880 and the outbreak of World
War I in 1914.63 A significant number of these immigrants and their children
improved their lives, became "Americanized," and participated in the
democratic process and the economy. 64 Only after World War I did the United
States try to limit immigration and to end it, as much as possible, from eastern
and southern Europe and most of the rest of the world.
v.

EAST ASIAN IMMIGRATION

Until the 1850s, virtually all voluntary immigrants to the United States
were from Europe or were of European origin.65 In common parlance, they

62

Not well studied is the huge amount wealth that was transferred to the United States during

this period. Even poor immigrants brought some money with them.
63
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 56-57.
This continues to be the case. Cities in decline in the 21st century are seeking immigrants
because they provide economic growth and safer environments. "Immigrants are especially likely
to move into the most blighted neighborhoods and spruce them up." Rolling Out the Welcome
Mat, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21642226-twocities-hope-embracing-immigrants-can-reverse-their-deline-rolling-out-welcome.
Indeed,
"[s]everal studies suggest that when immigrants arrive, crime goes down, schools improve and
shops open up." Id.
65
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 57. Slaves imported from Africa were
"immigrants" at one level, although surely unwilling immigrants. After 1808, it was illegal to
import slaves into the United States, although a small number of slaves were illegally imported.
Finkelman, The American Suppression, supra note 32, at 432. A small number of free blacks
came to the United States in the wake of the Haitian revolution, and a smattering of blacks
migrated from the Caribbean to the United States from 1820 to 1860. Id. at 439-40. In 1860, the
census found just over 7,000 people of Caribbean birth living in the United States, but this figure
does not indicate how many were black and how many were white. Campbell J. Gibson & Emily
Lennon, HistoricalCensus Statistics on the Foreign-BornPopulation of the United States: 18501990 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab04.html.
64
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were "white. 66 Americans began trading with China shortly after the
Revolution and an occasional Chinese sailor or merchant came to the nation.
They were, for the most part, curiosities, strange in their physical appearance,
clothing, and manners. They were so few in number that no one was alarmed
by their presence. In the first half of the 19th century, a handful of Chinese
came to the United States, mostly as sailors on American ships returning from
Asia. The federal government recorded fewer than 50 Chinese immigrants and
90 other Asian immigrants before 1849.67 In 1850, the census found 758 people
of Chinese birth in the country.68 Most of the Chinese in the United States in
1850 had recently moved to California, as had tens of thousands of other
foreigners, to participate in the California gold rush. Californians initially saw
these Chinese as just an unusual, but hard working, component of the massive
international gold rush. They were once again seen as curiosities with their
exotic religion, dress, hair styles, food, and language. In January 1852,
Governor John McDougal of California praised these few Chinese immigrants
as "one of the most worthy classes of our newly adopted citizens," who were
well suited to the climate and especially useful for draining the Golden State's
swamps. 69 But, such views were not long lasting. By the end of the decade the
Chinese in California and Oregon were the subject of discriminatory laws and
lethal vigilante violence.7 °
The gold rush, the rapid development of a mostly empty state, and
massive railroad building created a seemingly insatiable appetite for labor. All
this led to a significant rise in Chinese immigration to the west coast. In 1850,
there were only 1,135 people of Asian birth living in the United States. 7 1 In the
1850s, more than 40,000 Chinese came into the country, 72 and in 1860, there

66

When some poor immigrants came to America, they were sometimes perceived as "non-

white," even though physically they were no different than other European immigrants. Irish
immigrants were sometimes portrayed as looking like people of African ancestry and sometimes
referred to as the "black Irish." NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 40-59 (1995).
Similarly, many white Protestants of British origins believed that Jews were a separate "nonwhite" race. See generally KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS, AND WHAT THAT
SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA (1998).

supra note 6, at 59.

67

HISTORICAL STATISTICS,

68

Gibson & Lennon, supra note 65.

69

CHARLES J. MCCLAIN,

IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY:

THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST

(1994) (quoting GUNTHER BARTH,
STRENGTH: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1870, at 136 (1964)).
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 9
70

BITTER

See generally RONALD T. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF

ASIAN AMERICANS (1990).

71

Table 2, Region of Birth of the Foreign-BornPopulation:1850 to 1930 and 1960 to 1990,

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/
tab02.html [hereinafter Table 2] (last updated Oct. 21, 2011).
72

HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 59.
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were over 36,000 Chinese nationals in the country.7 3 This number grew to
64,000 by 1870 and eventually surpassed 107,000 by 1880.14 These numbers
may undercount the Chinese population, because in this period more than
200,000 Chinese immigrants arrived. 75 During these three decades, almost all
Asians in the United States were from China.76 While entrepreneurs and
railroad executives in California welcomed this source of cheap labor, the vast
majority of Californians and Oregonians came to resent the presence of these
apparently strange people whose culture, language, religion, dress, hair style,
food-and most of all physical appearance-were so alien to most Americans.
The Chinese on the West Coast soon faced significant discrimination in
California, Oregon, Washington, and some other western states.77 Laws
prevented them from testifying against whites 78 and other non-Chinese.7 9 In
People v. Hall, the California Supreme Court upheld the state's laws
prohibiting Chinese from testifying against whites.8 ° After the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, these rules gradually disappeared, but courts remained
skeptical of the value of Chinese testimony.8 ' Thus, in 1880, the Oregon
Supreme Court allowed the admission of a dying declaration of a Chinese man,

73
74

Table 2, supra note 71.
Id.

75

HISTORICAL STATISTICS,

supra note 6, at 59.
Between 1861 and 1882, only 350 Japanese migrated to the United States. Id. In the same
period, fewer than 450 people immigrated from all of the rest of Asia (other than from the
Ottoman Empire). Id. Most (about 440) came from India. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 567-68 (Millennial ed., 2006) [hereinafter
76

HISTORICAL STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL].

For good histories of this discrimination, see MCCLAIN, supra note 68, and SALYER, supra
note 49.
78
California's Law on Testimony in Court, Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch. 99, 14, 1850 Cal. Stat.
229, 230, provided that "[n]o black or mulatto person, or Indian, shall be permitted to give
evidence in favor of, or against, a white person." During the Civil War, the legislature modified
this law to allow black testimony, while explicitly prohibiting Chinese testimony against whites
with this language: "[n]o Indian, or person having one half or more of Indian blood, or
Mongolian, or Chinese, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor or against any white person."
Act of Mar. 16, 1863, ch. 68, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stats. 60 amending ch. 70, § 14, 1851 Cal. Stat. 114;
Amendment to § 14 of the Crimes Act of 1850, ch. 70, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69. See J.A.C. Grant,
Testimonial Exclusion Because of Race: A Chapterin the Historyof Intolerance in California, 17
UCLA L. REv. 192 (1969).
79
See People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869) (holding that Chinese could not testify
against blacks).
80
See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (holding that this statute prohibited Chinese from
testifying against whites).
81 See, e.g., Oregon v. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214, 218 (1880). The anti-Chinese racism was
complicated by religious prejudice. Because the Chinese were not Christians, many jurists and
others believed that their oath on the Bible, "to tell the truth," had no meaning and would not
constrain them from lying.
77
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despite the "heathenish religion of his race[.],, 82 In 1886, the same court
observed that "[e]xperience convinces every one that the testimony of Chinese
witnesses is very unreliable, and that they are apt to be actuated by motives that
are not honest. 83 Such racism coming from the bench bolstered hostility to
Chinese immigration. At the federal level, Chinese immigrants were barred
from naturalization, 84 although under the Fourteenth Amendment, their
85
American-born children were citizens.
Hostility to Chinese immigration culminated in the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882,86 which dramatically reduced Chinese immigration. In 1882,
nearly 40,000 Chinese immigrated to the United States.87 Only 8,031 came the
88
following year, and two years later, there were only 22 Chinese immigrants.
In the wake of the 1882 law, the growth of the Chinese-born population in the
United States began to decline. In 1870, there were over 63,000 Chinese-born
residents in the country, and this number grew to 105,000 by 1880.89 But the
Exclusion Act of 1882, combined with deaths and return migration, changed
this. Between 1880 and 1884, more than 63,000 Chinese came to the United
States, 90 but in 1890, there were just 109,000 Chinese in the country, only
4,000 more than ten years earlier. 9 1 By 1900, the population had declined to
82,000, and by 1910, there were only about 57,900 Chinese-born residents in
the United States. 92 These figures may undercount the Chinese population, as
many immigrant Chinese probably avoided any contact with government
officials and many people did not list a country origin on their census forms.
Nevertheless, it is clear the exclusion led to a dramatic decline in the number of
Chinese immigrants entering the country. Despite its name, the law did not

82

Id.

83

State v. Mah Jim, 13 Or. 235, 236 (1886) (ordering a new trial to allow for a more

extensive cross-examination of a Chinese witness in the murder prosecution of another Chinese).
See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795); Naturalization Act
84
of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 256 (allowing whites and Africans and people of African ancestry
to become citizens); 1 Rev. Stat. 378, 380 (1878), § 2169 ("The provisions of this Title shall
apply to aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of African nativity and to persons of
African descent.").
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
85
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.").
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), repealed by Magnuson Act of 1943,
86
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. See generally SALYER, supra note 49; MCCLAIN, supra note 69.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 59.
87
88

Id.

89

91

Gibson & Lennon, supra note 65; Table 2, supra note 71.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 59.
Gibson & Lennon, supra note 65; Table 2, supra note 71.

92

Gibson & Lennon, supra note 65; Table 2, supra note 71.

90
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exclude all Chinese immigrants. Rather, it specifically banned the immigration
of Chinese laborers. 93 Chinese merchants, students, and tourists were still
allowed to enter the nation, as were the wives and children of Chinese men
living in the United States. 4 This included women who were married in China
through proxies and
95 saw their husbands for the first time when they arrived in
the United States.
In the end the Exclusion Act was more porous than its supporters
expected, which only tended to infuriate opponents of Asian immigration.
Thus, another 50,000 Chinese would enter the U.S. from 1885 until the
beginning of World War I, but this was fewer than the number who arrived just
in the two years of 1881 and 1882.96 Congress amended the law a number of
times to limit immigration and to prevent some Chinese aliens from returning
to the United States if they left the country. 97 The Supreme Court upheld these
regulations in various cases,9 8 although occasionally the Court required a
certain level of fairness in their application.99

Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59 (1882) ("That from and after the
expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten years
next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the
same is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese
laborer to come, or, having so come after the expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the
United States.").
94
Id. § 6, 22 Stat. at 60 ("That in order to the faithful execution of articles one and two of the
treaty in this act before mentioned, every Chinese person other than a laborer who may be
entitled by said treaty and this act to come within the United States, and who shall be about to
come to the United States, shall be identified as so entitled by the Chinese Government in each
case, such identity to be evidenced by a certificate issued under the authority of said government,
which certificate shall be in the English language or (if not in the English language) accompanied
by a translation into English, stating such right to come, and which certificate shall state the
name, title, or official rank, if any, the age, height, and all physical peculiarities, former and
present occupation or profession, and place of residence in China of the person to whom the
certificate is issued and that such person is entitled conformably to the treaty in this act
mentioned to come within the United States. Such certificate shall be prima-facie evidence of the
fact set forth therein, and shall be produced to the collector of customs, or his deputy, of the port
in the district in the United States at which the person named therein shall arrive.").
95
From 1884 (the year the Act was fully implemented) until 1902, Chinese immigration into
the country averaged 2,000 people a year. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 58-59. In the
20 years from 1863 to 1882 (the last year of open migration from China) about 11,000 Chinese
per year (more than 220,000 overall) came to the United States. Id. at 567-68.
93

96

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL

TIMES TO 1957, at 59-60 (1960).
97
Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476
("An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Laborers to the United States"); Geary Act of 1892,
ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 ("An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States").
98
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (also known as the Chinese
Exclusion Case); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the
power of Congress to deport aliens who were of an "undesirable" race). See generally Gabriel J.
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VI. THE NEW YELLOW PERIL: JAPANESE IMMIGRATION

In 1882, when Congress passed the Exclusion Act, almost all Asian
immigration was from China. Between 1860 and 1882, fewer than 350
Japanese migrated to the United States, although the census in 1880 actually
found 401 Japanese born residents. 00 Some of these were probably students
who were not immigrants.101 At the time, it was illegal for Japanese to
emigrate. 10 2 That changed in the mid-1880s. The number of Japanese
immigrants grew from 49 in 1885 to 194 in 1886.103 In 1890, more than 1,700
Japanese came to the United States, and after that, Japanese immigration grew
rapidly to over 12,000 in 1900 and 30,000 by 1907. 104
Most of the pre-1882 Chinese immigrants had been rural peasants.
They were largely illiterate and impoverished. They readily accepted work as
agricultural laborers or building railroads. But many Japanese were literate
skilled farmers. They came to the United States expecting to own land and
prosper. In California they almost immediately faced hostility because they
were not the kind of immigrants that employers wanted. Meanwhile, their racial
distinctness made them targets of discrimination. They were seen like the
Chinese, except worse. The United States Industrial Commission, for example,
declared in 1901 that the Japanese "are more servile than the Chinese, but less
obedient and far less desirable. They have most of the vices of the Chinese, but
none of the virtues. They underbid the Chinese in everything, and are as a class

Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1998) (concluding that the Plenary Power doctrine as applied
to race is anachronistic).
99
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
100 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 59-60; Gibson & Lennon, supra note 65; Table 2,
supra note 71.
101 For example, in 1876, Kozu Senzaburo was allowed to come to the United States to study
law at Albany Law School. Minorities, ALB. L. SCH., http://www.albanylaw.edu/about/history/
Pages/Minorities.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). He would return to Japan in 1878. Id.That
year, Kentar6 Kaneko, later Baron Kaneko, graduated from Harvard College two years ahead of
Theodore Roosevelt. Kaneko would return to Japan with a position in the Imperial University in
Tokyo until he entered the government. In 1900, he would become the Japanese Minister of
Justice. I have used the western convention in Japanese names, putting the family name Kaneko
after his "given name." In Japan he would have been Kaneko Kentar6. See Ken Gewertz, History
of the Japanese at Harvard, HARv. U. GAZETTE, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/02.26/l 1japan.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
102
Immigration: Japanese, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/
presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/japanese.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
103
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 58-59.
'0o Id. at 58.
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tricky, unreliable and dishonest."10 5 Furthermore, there was some level of anger
because Californians believed they had stopped East Asian immigration with
the 1882 Act, and suddenly, Asians were once again immigrating through San
Francisco Bay.
At the time Congress passed the Exclusion Act, Japan did not allow its
citizens to freely emigrate,106 and consequently, there were virtually no
Japanese immigrants in the United States. Nor were immigrants coming from
Korea, Siam (now Thailand), or any other part of East and Southeast Asia at
this time. Thus, immigrants from Japan were not covered by the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882.107 When Japan changed its laws to allow its citizens to
emigrate, there were still relatively few Japanese immigrants. Japanese
immigration was initially slow and did not attract much attention in California
until the late-1890s. Hostility to Asian immigrants, especially in California,
Oregon, and the new state of Washington continued to focus mainly on the
Chinese. 08 Congress tinkered with the Chinese Exclusion Act in the 1880s and
1890s, and in 1902, finally settled the issue by making the Act permanent.l0 9
By 1890, there were only 2,039 Japanese nationals in the country, but,
by 1900, there were more than 24,000, with just over 10,000 of them in
Califomia.1 0 In the next eight years, Japanese emigration to the United States
exploded, as 127,000 Japanese entered the country."' Just as Ellis Island
proved to be a "Golden Door" for millions of Europeans in this period, San
Francisco was very much a Golden Gate beckoning Japanese immigrants.
When Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, China was
a weak and almost powerless nation. Its prestige and power continued to
decline, thus making it impossible for China to protest or fight against this antiChinese legislation. In the wake of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901, seven western
powers plus Japan forced China to cede virtual sovereignty over some of its

105

JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION:

CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVACUATIONS OF THE JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II 23-24

(1954).
106 Immigration:Japanese,supra note 102.
107 There were only 148 Japanese nationals in the United States in 1880, 86 of whom were in
California. Most were students. POLITICS OF PREJUDICE, supra note 3.
108 See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 69; SALYER, supra note 49.
109

Scott Act of 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176 ("An Act to Prohibit the Coming into and to

Regulate the Residence Within the United States, its Territories, and all Territory Under its
Jurisdiction, and the District of Columbia, of Chinese Persons and Persons of Chinese Descent");
Chin, supra note 98, at 36-37.
110 Akira Iriye, Japan as a Competitor, in MUTUAL IMAGES: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN-JAPANESE

RELATIONS 73, 76 (Akira Iriye ed., 1975) (placing total Japanese immigration into the United
States at 35,000 in 1899).
III See generally POLITICS OF PREJUDICE, supra note 3. By this time there were also about
30,000 Japanese workers in Hawaii. Japanese Immigration to Hawaii, HAWAII FOR VISITORS,
http://www.hawaiiforvisitors.com/about/japanese-immigration.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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territory and pay enormous reparations. A year later, the ban on Chinese
Immigrants to the United States was made permanent. 112 Supporters of the
1902 law argued that the Chinese should be permanently excluded from the
United States because they were racially inferior and incapable of ever being
true Americans. As one member of Congress put it during this debate, "the
Chinaman in America is forever and always an alien."' 11 3 Members of Congress
asserted that "the Mongolian race [is] not a desirable addition to our
However, the law only affected Chinese immigration, even
population. '
though presumably Japanese were also members of "the Mongolian race."
The failure to include the Japanese in the final Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1902 infuriated some in California. As early as 1899, the San Francisco
Chronicle argued "that Japanese immigration was more serious than Chinese
because Japan had attained the status of a great power whereas China had
not."" 5 Similarly, in 1901, Governor Henry T. Gage noted the "Japanese
problem" in his annual message. 116 But the insights of the Chronicle indicated
why the United States was not ready to ban Japanese immigration. It was one
thing to insult the powerless and weak Chinese government. It was quite
another to insult Japan, which was about to attain "the status of a great
power."' 1' 7 In addition, even in 1902, there were still relatively few Japanese in
the United States. Moreover, in 1900, the Japanese government announced that
it would voluntarily restrict emigration to the United States by reducing the
number of exit visas the Japanese government would issue to common
laborers. " 18 This was the first Gentlemen's Agreement.
Initially, this first Gentlemen's Agreement achieved its goals. Japanese
emigration to the United States declined from over 12,000 in 1900 to just under
5,000 in 1901."9 However, despite the intentions of the Japanese government,
Japanese migration to the United States began to increase after 1901.120 The

112

Scott Act of 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176 ("An Act to Prohibit the Coming into and to

Regulate the Residence Within the United States, its Territories, and all Territory Under its
Jurisdiction, and the District of Columbia, of Chinese Persons and Persons of Chinese Descent").
113
Chin, supra note 98, at 36-37 (quoting 35 CONG. REC. 3807 (1902) (statement of Rep.
Mondell)).
114 Id. at 37 (quoting 35 CONG. REC. 3781 (1902) (statement of Rep. Lacey)).
115
Iriye, supra note 110, at 76.
116
Buell, supra note 3, at 609.
117
118

Iriye, supranote 110, at 76.
Gentleman's Agreement, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/gentlemens-agreement

(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
119
Iriye, supra note 110, at 76.
120
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 58. Japanese immigration dropped from over
12,500 in 1900 to just over 5,000 in 1901, but in 1902, it had jumped to more than 14,000, and
with the exception of a dip in 1905-the year of the Russo-Japanese War-Japanese immigration
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1900 agreement only limited Japanese migration to the mainland of the United
States, and under the agreement, a significant number of Japanese common
laborers emigrated to Hawaii, where they found work in the expanding sugar
industry. Once in Hawaii, some Japanese laborers then moved on to
California.12 1 In addition, Japanese also went to Mexico and Canada and then
moved to the United States. 122 Thus, despite the agreement, Japanese
immigration was still growing. This led to an explosion of nativist 123 opposition
to the Japanese, in California and especially in San Francisco.
Californians wanted to end Japanese immigration and also, as much as
possible, to undermine the economic and social progress of the Japanese in the
United States. However, curbing Japanese immigration was not as simple as
dramatically reducing Chinese immigration. China was an utterly weak and
powerless nation in the late-19th century while Japan was a rising power by the
early-20th century.
In 1894, Japan and the United States had signed a commercial treaty
that gave Japan most-favored-nation status with the United States, which in part
meant that Japanese citizens were generally allowed to enter the United States
without restriction. 124 The treaty recognized Japan's new prestige in the world.
While the treaty was being negotiated, Japan successfully flexed its growing
military muscle in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), which resulted in
Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate, China ceding Taiwan to Japan, and
China paying indemnities to Japan. In the Boxer Rebellion (1900-190 1), Japan
provided more troops than any other nation to protect Western (and Japanese)
citizens and interests in China. Japan's 20,000 or so troops constituted about
40% of the foreign forces used to suppress the rebellion.
The wisdom of a policy that respected Japan's growing prestige and
power became clear four years later, when Japan startled the world by defeating

remained at or above that figure until 1909, when the second Gentlemen's Agreement
dramatically reduced Japanese immigration.
121 Buell, supra note 3, at 613-14.
122

Id.

123

Nativists were Americans, almost exclusively Protestants and usually of British ancestry,

who opposed the immigration of non-Protestants, Asians, and even Protestants who were not
from Britain or at least northern Europe. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (1985).
124 Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 22, 1894, 29 Stat. 848.
Immigration officials could still exclude Japanese Immigrants who were "paupers or persons
likely to become a public charge," under the Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1085.
The Supreme Court upheld the application of the 1891 law regulating immigrants in Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), allowing the government to exclude Nishimura Ekiu because
she arrived with just $22, her passport falsely claimed she was "in company with her husband,"
and she had no destination other than "some hotel" where she was to wait "until her husband
calls for her." Id. at 651-52. The Court reaffirmed this application of the 1891 law to Japanese
immigrants after the 1894 treaty in Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
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Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. The smaller, non-Western, non-Christian
country had defeated the largest nation in Europe. In the 1850s, Czar Nicholas I
had referred to the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe,"' 125 but Japan
showed that Russia itself was equally sick and weak. Japan was clearly a power
to be reckoned with, and not one to be gratuitously insulted. In 1905, President
Theodore Roosevelt negotiated an end to the war between Russia and Japan,
and in 1906, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. 126 While
leading the peace talks, Roosevelt came to appreciate Japan's economic
strength and its military prowess. Roosevelt also observed that the Japanese
were particularly sensitive to the racism of the Russians and other westerners
during both the war and the peace negotiations. 127 Insulting this country was
simply not a good idea.
Japan's rise as an important power coincided with two other
developments that affected relations with the United States and made it even
more important (for diplomatic reasons) that the United States not insult Japan
with immigration restrictions in 1902. Since the mid-19th century, the United
States had been developing outposts in the Pacific Ocean. In 1856, the
American Guano Company claimed Baker Island 128 and Jarvis Island 129 under
the Guano Act of 1856.130 In 1857, other Americans claimed Howland Island' 3
under the Guano Act. In 1860, the U.S. Guano Company claimed Kingman

125

KARL MARX, THE EASTERN QUESTION:

A

REPRINT OF LETTERS WRITTEN IN

1853-1856,

at

289-290 (1897) (citing Sir G.H. Hamilton Seymore in a diplomatic dispatch from January 7,
1853). In this dispatch, Seymour described his conversations with the Czar, reporting that Czar
Nicholas I described the Ottoman Empire as "a sick man-a very sick man. "Id. at 290.
126
Theodore Roosevelt - Biographical,NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/
peace/laureates/1906/roosevelt-bio.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
127 See, for example, complaints about racist attitudes toward the Japanese in Baron Kentar6
Kaneko, Japan's Position in the Far East, 26 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 77 (1905).
For a fascinating discussion of the startled response of the western world to Japan's victory over
a European nation, and Japanese shock at continued racist responses to them, see MARILYN LAKE
& HENRY REYNOLDS, DRAWING THE GLOBAL COLOUR LINE: WHITE MEN'S COUNTRIES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE OF RACIAL EQUALITY 166-72 (2008). A young scholar at Oxford,
for example, called the result of the war "the most important historical event which has
happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime, the victory of a non-white people over a white
people." Id. at 166.
128
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-98-5, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICATION OF
U.S. CONSTITUTION
54 (1997) [hereinafter INSULAR AREAS], available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf. Baker Island, which is uninhabited, is about
1,650 miles southwest of Honolulu. Id.
29 Id. at 55-56. Jarvis Island is about 1,350 miles southwest of Honolulu. Id. at 55.
130
Id. at 54-56. Guano is the dried accumulation of feces from seabirds used as fertilizer. Id.
THE

at 9; see also 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411-19 (2013).
131 INSULAR AREAS, supra note 128, at 55. Howland, which is uninhabited,
is about 1,300
miles southwest of Honolulu. Id. at 54-55.
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Reef under the Guano Act. 132 More importantly, in 1867, a U.S. Naval
expedition claimed the Midway Islands for the United States,
and in 1869,
Congress appropriated $50,000 to create a naval coaling station there. 134 During
and immediately after the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States
dramatically expanded its overseas Pacific presence. The United States
acquired Guam and the Philippines from Spain, quickly building military and
naval bases in both places. '3That year, the United States annexed the Republic
of Hawaii (with the consent of the Hawaiian government) 136 and also annexed
Wake Atoll 3 3 and Palmyra Atoll. 138 After the Boxer Rebellion (1901), the

United States also had a presence in China. Thus, by 1902, the United States
had substantial interests in the western Pacific, and good relations with Japan
were even more imperative. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an
executive order that placed Midway Atoll under the jurisdiction and control of
the U.S. Navy, 39 expanding the growing U.S. military presence closer to
Japan. In addition, in 1904, the United States began construction of the Panama
Canal,140 which would give the United States a greater Pacific presence. Thus,
just as Japan was emerging as a world power, it faced a powerful non-Asian
nation edging close to its doorstep, asserting its own growing political,
economic, and military might, with the near-term potential (once the Canal was
completed) to easily move its fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
American officials saw the rise of Japan and the development of
America's Pacific empire as a source of potential conflict. In 1906, in the wake
of Japan's stunning victory over Russia (which included sinking virtually all of
Russia's navy), Secretary of State Elihu Root told a cabinet colleague that
"Japan is ready for war," because it had "the most effective equipment and
132 Id. at 57. Kingman Reef, which is uninhabited, is about 900 miles south of Honolulu.

131

Id.

Id. at 60.

Navy Appropriations Act for 1870, ch. 48, 15 Stat. 276, 279; see also S. Rep. No. 40-194
(1869).
135 Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
136
Newlands Resolution, J.Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
137 INSULAR AREAS, supra note 128, at 63. "Brigadier General Francis Greene stopped at Wake
in 1898 en route to the Philippines during the Spanish-American War and raised the American
flag on the island. The following year, Commander Taussig of the U.S. Navy landed on Wake
and took possession of the island for the United States." Id.
138
Id. at 7. "Palmyra was once part of the Territory of Hawaii, but was expressly excluded
when Hawaii became a state." Id.
134

139 Exec. Order No. 199-A (1903), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,048, 27 Fed. Reg. 8851
(Sept. 4, 1962).
140 Under the Spooner Act, the United States purchased the right to the French canal project.

Spooner Act of 1902 (Panama Canal Act of 1902), 32 Stat. 481. Under the Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty of Nov. 18, 1903, the United States obtained the right to dig from the local government.
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, U.S.-Pan., Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234. The United States
purchased the right from Panama in 1904. Panama Canal Act of 1904, 33 Stat. 429.
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[military] personnel in the world." 141 In 1907 and 1908, the Roosevelt
administration began to seriously gather intelligence about Japanese military
capabilities and its "preparedness for war."' 142 In 1907 and 1908, just as the last
part of the second Gentlemen's Agreement was being negotiated, President
Theodore Roosevelt sent 16 battleships (with numerous escort and support
vessels)-known as the Great White Fleet for the color the ships were
painted-on a world-wide cruise.143 Roosevelt was clearly worried about rising
tensions with Japan, telling Secretary of State Root: "I am more concerned over
the Japanese situation than almost any other. Thank Heaven we have the navy
in good shape.
It is high time, however, that it should go on a cruise around the
44
world." 1
The message of America's vast naval power, with its state-of-the-art
dreadnaughts, was clear to the Japanese when the Great White Fleet steamed
into Yokahama Bay in October 1908.145 Roosevelt could not control the
"hideous sensationalism and offensiveness of the yellow press," which was a
"serious a menace to us in our foreign relations."' 146 The President correctly
feared that the attacks on Japan and Japanese-Americans in the press, combined
with the actions of the officials in California and some violent attacks on
Japanese in San Francisco, would "cause the greatest irritation against us" in
Japan. 47 Thus, Roosevelt hoped that this demonstration of American naval
prowess would temper Japanese responses to the virulent racism against them
coming out of California.
VII. THE RISE OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT, SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN SAN
FRANCISCO, AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

At the same time that both nations were emerging as Pacific powers,
Japanese emigration to the United States increased. This was in part a result of
the success of the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1882, the year the Exclusion Act
was passed (but before it went into effect), just under 39,600 Chinese had
entered the United States, most of whom were laborers. 148 But in the entire
decade of the 1890s, only about 20,000 Chinese arrived, most of whom were

142

Iriye, supra note 110, at 79.
Id.at 85.

143

See generally JAMES

141

R. RECKNER, TEDDY ROOSEVELT'S GREAT WHITE FLEET (1988).

144 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root (July 13, 1907), in 5 THE LETTERS
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 717 (Elting E. Morison et al. eds., 1952) [hereinafter 5 LETTERS].
145

See generally RECKNER, supra note 143.

146

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, in 5 LETTERS, supra note 144, at 717.
Id.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 567.

147

148
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not laborers. 149 The cumulative effect of this decline in Chinese labor-what
people at the time called Coolie labor-stimulated the rapid increase in
Japanese immigration. In the face of this labor shortage, businesses in
California, desperate for more inexpensive labor, began to encourage
immigration from Japan. 150 These business leaders assumed that the Japanese
would be pliant and ready to work for very low wages.
The rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in California was tied to labor
conditions, California's half century of hostility to Asian immigration, and the
growing number of Japanese immigrants coming to the United States.," 1 As
much as Japanese labor was needed, the majority of white Californians,
especially those in urban areas, resented these new immigrants. Initially, the
response to the Japanese was a carryover from anti-Chinese attitudes-as
Roger Daniels perceptively noted, "[i]n 1900 the anti-Japanese campaign...
was mainly a tail to the anti-Chinese kite."' 5 2 But, the focus of anti-Japanese
sentiment shifted as white Californians realized that Japanese immigrants
(unlike the Chinese) were intent on obtaining an education for themselves and
their children, and moving beyond the role of unskilled laborers. In 1900, the
voice of San Francisco's labor movement offered a deeply racist analysis of
Japanese immigration that highlighted the upward mobility and middle class
aspirations of the Japanese:
Chinatown with its reeking filth and dirt, its gambling dens and
obscene slave pens, its coolie labor and bloodthirsty tongs, is a
menace to the community; but the sniveling Japanese, who
swarms along the streets and cringingly offers his paltry
services for a suit of clothes and a front seat in our public
schools, is a far greater danger to the laboring portion of [our]
society than all the opium-soaked pigtails who have ever
blotted the fair name of this beautiful city. 153
White working class Californians resented the Japanese, not only because they
were non-white competitors, but because they also seemed poised to leapfrog
over them in economic status.
The San Francisco Chronicle later observed that the Japanese
"probably would have attracted small attention" if they "had... throttled
[their] ambition."' 154 But, the Chronicle noted, the fact that the Japanese aspired

149

Buell, supra note 3, at 606;

150

TENBROEK ET AL.,

151

Id. at 23-24.

152

POLITICS OF PREJUDICE, supra note

153

TENBROEK ET AL., supra note 105, at 24 (quoting the Journal of Organized Labor).

154

HARRY

H.L.

HISTORICAL STATISTICS,

supra note 6, at 567.

supra note 105, at 11-67.
3, at 21.

KITANO, JAPANESE AMERICANS: THE EVOLUTION OF A SUBCULTURE

16 (1969)

(quoting a San Francisco Chronicle article from 1910).
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"to progress beyond mere servility to the plane of the better class of American
workman and to own a home with him" and that when they achieved that status
they "cease[d] to be an ideal laborer."'' 55 This may have been somewhat of an
exaggeration, because anti-Asian sentiment in California undoubtedly would
have been directed at the Japanese no matter how much or how little education
they sought or how much economic progress they achieved. The Chinese, after
all, faced discrimination and exclusion even though they were mostly also
viewed as "ideal laborer[s]."' 156 Nevertheless, the paper's main point is
probably accurate: that resentment toward the Japanese grew as they sought
and achieved upward mobility. The fact that the crisis leading to the final
Gentlemen's Agreement came over school segregation reflects this tension.
At the very time Japan was rising as an international power-and as
President Roosevelt was coming to admire the nation and its people-the
United States Industrial Commission told the nation that the Japanese "are
more servile than the Chinese, but less obedient and far less desirable. They
have most of the vices of the Chinese, with none of the virtues. They underbid
the Chinese in everything, and are as a class tricky, unreliable, and
dishonest."'' 57 This official position of a United States Government agency
clashed dramatically with President Roosevelt's foreign policy goals and the
respect he gained for the Japanese while negotiating an end to the RussoJapanese War. After these negotiations, Roosevelt told a confidant: "I
thoroughly admire and believe in the Japanese."' 158 He was particularly
impressed that throughout these negotiations, the Japanese "always told me the
truth," unlike the Russians. 159
The theme of anti-Japanese sentiment was the simultaneous fear that
the Japanese would undercut wages-"[t]hey underbid the Chinese in
everything" as the United States Industrial Commission claimed 16° -while at
the same time they sought to improve their status through home ownership and
education--"a front seat in our public schools" as the journal OrganizedLabor
put it. 16 These themes coalesced in the crisis that precipitated the second

155
156

Id.
Id.

157

15 U.S. INDUS. COMM'N, REPORTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND

EDUCATION 754 (1901).
158

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan (1905), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT

CYCLOPEDIA 273 (Albert
ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA].

Bushnell Hart & Herbert Ronal Ferlinger eds., 1941) [hereinafter

159

Id.

160

15 U.S. INDUS. COMM'N, supra note 157, at 754.
TENBROEK ET AL., supra note 105, at 24.
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Gentlemen's Agreement in 1908,
when San Francisco tried to segregate the
162
schools.
public
the
in
Japanese
In 1905, the San Francisco school board passed a resolution to
segregate all Asians in the city's public schools. However, the San Francisco
earthquake in April 1906 delayed its implementation. On October 11, 1906, the
school board passed a new resolution to segregate all Asian students.163 When
schools reopened after the earthquake, the Japanese were excluded from
schools that they had previously attended. 64 In this regard, the Japanese were
treated the same way as the Chinese and other Asians. 16W
But the Japanese government was not the same as the Chinese, and the
relationship between the United States and Japan was far different from
China's relationship to the United States. Fresh from its victory in the RussoJapanese War, as well as providing the largest number of foreign troops to
suppress the Boxer Rebellion, Japan was a growing power unwilling to ignore
this insult from the San Francisco school board. The Japanese government
immediately protested to President Theodore Roosevelt, complaining that this
segregation violated the 1894 treaty between the two nations, 166 which
provided that "the citizens or subjects of each of the two High Contracting
Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the
territories of the other Contracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect
protection for their persons and property."' 67 The treaty also provided that "in
all other matters connected with the administration of justice they shall enjoy
all the rights and privileges enjoyed by native citizens or subjects." 168
The Japanese government naturally believed that, under these
provisions of the 1894 treaty, Japanese immigrants and their children could not
be segregated. On the other hand, the Californians doubtlessly saw their policy
as consistent with the American constitutional regime, which allowed the states

162

For the best summary of anti-Japanese sentiment in this period, see POLITICS OF PREJUDICE,

supra note 3, at 1-30.
163
5 LETTERS, supra note 144, at 473 n. 1.
164

Ironically, Japanese citizens and the Japanese government sent about $244,960 in

earthquake relief to the city of San Francisco just before the school segregation rules were
implemented. This constituted more than half of all foreign relief money sent to San Francisco.
Japanese earthquake experts also came to California to consult with authorities and help them
prepare for future earthquakes. Some of them were attacked by anti-Japanese thugs in the city.
POLITICS OF PREJUDCIE, supra note 3, at 33; see also RoY HIDEMICHI AKAGI, JAPAN'S FOREIGN

RELATIONS, 1542-1936: A SHORT HISTORY 433 (1936).
165
It is also worth noting that this did not differ from the practice of segregating blacks
throughout the South and in some places in the North and West.
166 See Aoki, supra note 5, at 48.
167

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1894, 29 Stat. 848.

168

Id.
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to regulate race relations almost at will. In a series of decisions 169 culminating
in Plessy v. Ferguson,1 70 the Supreme Court allowed the states to require
separate facilities for members of different races as long as the separate
facilities were "equal." By 1900, the pretense of equality for black facilities in
the South no longer existed, and the Supreme Court showed little inclination to
interfere with the South's aggressive segregation of all aspects of southern life.
By this time, all public schools in the South were completely segregated.' The
American South took advantage of the Plessy decision and other cases to
segregate almost every aspect of southern life. 172 Thus, Californians believed
that if white Southerners could segregate blacks and discriminate against them
in other ways, they could segregate all Asians, including the Japanese, and also
discriminate against them beyond the school setting. Indeed, the San Francisco
school policy was part of a larger movement in California to end all Japanese
immigration into the country. 173
There was, of course, an ironic difference between Japanese
immigrants and their children, and American blacks living in the South. The
rights of African-Americans were protected only by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and were dependent on the whims of the federal courts,
the national government, and, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state governments. In the Civil Rights Cases,174 the
Supreme Court held that Congress had limited power to regulate and protect the
civil rights of blacks under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Plessy v. Ferguson,
the Court allowed the states to practice segregation as. long as the separate
facilities were "equal," but the courts were never willing to require any proof
that facilities were actually "equal." Nor was the federal government willing to
exert its constitutional power to protect black voting rights or black civil rights
from state deprivation. Thus, the power of protecting the civil rights of black
Americans was, by this time, almost entirely in the hands of the state

169

For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in

HistoricalContext: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973-1027 (2005) [hereinafter
Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context] (book review) and Paul Finkelman, Original
Intent and the FourteenthAmendment: Into the Black Hole of ConstitutionalLaw, 89 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1019, 1019-63 (2014) [hereinafter Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth
Amendment].
170
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
171 In Berea College v. Kentucky, decided the same year as the Gentlemen's Agreement, the
Court would uphold a Kentucky law which required a private college to terminate its policy of
integrated education. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). For the history of segregated schools in the South see
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
172
See generallyPaul Finkelman, The Radicalism of Brown, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 35 (2004).

173
174

For background on this, see TENBROEK ET AL., supra note 105, at 11-67.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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governments. In the North, this led to state laws protecting civil rights 175 as
well as some segregation. 176 But in the South, the Court's narrow and racially
biased interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment left blacks trapped in a
world of increasing segregation.
By contrast, Japanese immigrants could legitimately turn to their home
country for protection and support. The government of Japan, operating under
the 1894 treaty and bolstered by its rising status as a military and economic
power, could demand protection for its citizens living in the United States.
Furthermore, the states-in this case California-were obligated to defer to the
federal government on the treatment of the Japanese because under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution a treaty was binding on the
states. 177 The treaty insured that Japanese immigrants "enjoy all the rights and
privileges enjoyed by native citizens or subjects."' 178 It would seem that this
clause made San Francisco's segregation order illegal, and in violation of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which made "all Treaties made ...
under the Authority of the United States ...the supreme Law of the Land." 7 9
Unlike blacks in the South, Japanese immigrants could demand
protection under a treaty and the Supremacy Clause, even if, like blacks, they
could not hope for racial justice under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the
segregation of the Japanese in California was an international issue in which
the administration in Washington had a concern.
Although President Roosevelt found the anti-Japanese movement in
California abhorrent, he was hardly a racial liberal. He believed that "race
purity must be maintained"' 80 and famously refused to support black soldiers
who defended themselves from the attacks of white civilians in Texas. 18' He
favored some limitations on Asian immigration and, to that extent, he
sympathized with some of the goals of the anti-Chinese movements on the
West Coast. In 1897, before he ran for vice president, he had endorsed limiting
Chinese immigration and other immigrant "laborers who are ignorant, vicious,
and with low standards of life and comfort."' 182 In his first annual message to
175

Finkelman, Civil Rights in HistoricalContext, supra note 169, at 979-91.

176

See generally DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER

NORTHERN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1865-1954 (2005).

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
178
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1894, 29 Stat. 848.
179 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
177

180

MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 24 (2004) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt).

181 Finkelman, Civil Rights in HistoricalContext, supra note 169, at 999.
182
ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 158, at 244 (citing Review of Reviews (Jan. 1897)).
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Congress, in the wake of the assassination of President William McKinley by
an immigrant anarchist, Roosevelt asked for legislation to prevent anarchist
immigrants, to "reenact immediately the law excluding Chinese laborers, and to
strengthen it wherever necessary in order to make its enforcement entirely
effective," and to "stop the influx of cheap labor."'1 83 In his annual message of
1905, he asserted that the nation could never "have too much immigration of
the right sort and we should have none whatever of the wrong sort.", 84 Chinese
laborers, anarchists, and the ignorant were clearly "the wrong sort."
However, unlike the West Coast nativists, Roosevelt was not opposed
to immigration per se, or to all Asian immigration. Unlike the Californians, he
clearly did not favor stopping all Japanese immigration. In fact, he greatly
admired the Japanese, and in his annual message in 1906, he suggested that
America's naturalization laws be changed to allow Japanese immigrants to
become citizens. 185 It is clear that he did not think the Japanese were "the
wrong sort." His notion of the "right" and "wrong sort" of immigrant was tied
to character and motivation and reflective of his own concepts of rugged
individualism. Thus, he argued that the United States should not "discriminate
for or against any man who desires to come here and become a citizen, save on
the ground of that man's fitness for citizenship."1 86 The nation had a "right and
duty to consider his moral and social quality," 187 but Roosevelt asserted that the
nation should:
Pay [no] heed to whether he is of one creed or another, of one
nation, or another. We cannot afford to consider whether he is
Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile; whether he is
Englishman or Irishman, Frenchman 88or German, Japanese,
Italian, Scandinavian, Slav, or Magyar.'
Roosevelt was not ready to support unlimited immigration from China, and
probably the Middle East and South Asia. But he clearly thought the Japanese
were as worthy as Europeans, and rejected prejudice against Japanese, just as

183

President Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in 14 A COMPILATION

OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6650-51 (James
184
President Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message

D. Richardson ed., 1897).
(Dec. 5, 1905), in 15 A

COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7007
1920) [hereinafter 15 RICHARDSON].
185
President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3,

(James D. Richardson ed.,
1906), in 15 RICHARDSON,

supra note 184, at 7055.
186
President Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in 15

RICHARDSON,

supra note 184, at 7008.
187
President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), in 15 RICHARDSON,
supra note 184, at 7055.
188

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/17

30

Finkelman: Coping with a New "Yellow Peril": Japanese Immigration, the Gentl

2015]

1439

COPING WITH A NEW "YELLOWPERIL"

he rejected prejudice against Germans, Irishmen, Frenchmen, Jews, Italians,
Englishmen, and other Europeans.
In this speech, Roosevelt then went on, at some length, to explain why
the "questions arising in connection with Chinese immigration stand by
themselves." 8 9 He endorsed "the policy of excluding Chinese laborers,
Chinese coolies," but he was not willing to exclude all Chinese.1 90 He declared
that "Chinese students, business and professional men of all kinds" including
"merchants" and "bankers, doctors, manufacturers, professors, travelers, and
the like-should be encouraged to come here."' 91 Thus it seems that the
president favored an immigration policy based on class, education, skills, and
moral stature, rather than race. Significantly, he listed the Japanese along with
Europeans as the kind of people the United States should allow into the nation,
and only singled out the Chinese for special consideration.
Roosevelt's views of the Japanese were complex and conflicted. He
thought Japan would become one of the "great civilized powers.' ' 192 But
because of race and "their own ancestral civilization" he also believed the
Japanese would "be of a different type from our civilizations."' 193 Despite these
racial and cultural differences, Roosevelt concluded that there were things
Japan "can teach us," and predicted that Japan would become a "formidable
industrial competitor."' 94 Thus, it was important to "treat her courteously,
generously, and justly, but we should keep our navy up and make it evident that
we are not influenced by fear."' 95 In his annual message to Congress in 1906,
Roosevelt extolled the virtues of Japanese society, pointing out that the growth
of Japan's economy under the Meiji was "literally astounding." 196 He noted that
Japan had "a glorious and ancient past" with a "civilization older than that of
the nations of northern Europe-the nations from whom the people of the
United States have chiefly sprung."'9' This statement is particularly significant,
given the growing obsession of most white American Protestants with racial
and ethnic heritage, the purity of races, and social Darwinian notions of

189 President Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in 15
supra note 184, at 7008-A9.
190
Id. at 7009.
191 Id.
192

RICHARDSON,

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice (Mar. 19, 1904), in 4 THE

LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

759-61 (Elting E. Morison et al eds., 1952) [hereinafter 4

LETTERS].
193 Id.

194 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge (June 16, 1905), in 4
supra note 192, at 1221, 1231.

LETTERS,

195 Id.
196 President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), in 15
supra note 184, at 7053.
197 Id.
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superior and inferior races. 198 Roosevelt had essentially concluded that the
Japanese were "equal" to white American Protestants of northern and western
European origins. The President stated that in the four decades of Meiji
modernization "[t]he Japanese have won in a single generation the right to
stand abreast of the foremost and most enlightened peoples of Europe and
America; they have won on their own merits and by ' their
own exertions the
99
right to treatment on a basis of full and frank equality."'
This claim to equality was bolstered by Japan's recent military
successes. Roosevelt, whose diplomatic experience had led him to a greater
understanding of Japan than most Americans had, declared that Japan "now
stands as one of the greatest of civilized nations; great in the arts of war and in
the arts of peace; great in military, in industrial and artistic development., 200 As
a military hero of the Spanish American War, Roosevelt noted that "Japanese
soldiers and sailors have shown themselves equal in combat to any of whom
history makes note. She has produced great generals and mighty admirals; her
fighting men, afloat and ashore., 20 1 Roosevelt praised "the heroic courage, the
unquestioning, unfaltering loyalty, the splendid indifference to hardship and
death" of Japanese sailors and soldiers.20 2
In addition to his growing admiration for the Japanese-and his respect
of their military prowess-Roosevelt correctly saw immigration policy as
belonging to the national government, and off limits to the states. He saw
California's attacks on the Japanese as particularly problematic, not only
because the state seemed to be usurping the plenary power of the national
government to regulate immigration and conduct foreign policy, but also
because California's
actions threatened the nation's diplomacy and ultimately
203
security.
its
A year before his public praise for the Japanese and his endorsement of
allowing Japanese immigrants to become naturalized citizens, Roosevelt had
analyzed the problematic nature of the California anti-Japanese movement in a
letter to his friend and ally, Henry Cabot Lodge. First, Roosevelt noted that the
198

ROBERT C. BANNISTER,

SOCIAL DARwNISM: SCIENCE AND MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN

SOCIAL THOUGHT (1989); CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND
REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1992); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL

(1944).
199 President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), in 15
supra note 184, at 7054.
DARwINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT

RICHARDSON,

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

See, e.g., Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, May 15, 1905 reprinted

in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT

LODGE, 1884-1918, at 122 (1925) [hereinafter SELECTIONS]; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to
Kermit Roosevelt (Oct. 27, 1906), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 144, at 475-76 (discussed infra at
notes 216-17).
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Japanese had "come around" to Roosevelt's position on how to end the RussoJapanese War. 20 4 Fresh from bringing the Japanese to the peace table by
convincing them that he was a fair broker, Roosevelt now faced the problem
that California would undermine his foreign policy. He told Lodge,
I am utterly disgusted at the manifestations which have begun
to appear on the Pacific slope in favor of excluding the
Japanese exactly as the Chinese are excluded. The California
State Legislature and various other bodies have acted in the
worst possible taste and in the most offensive manner to
Japan.
Roosevelt also found it particularly ironic that the Congressional
delegations from California and other states hostile to the Japanese were also
"lukewarm" about supporting his proposals for a stronger Navy. Roosevelt felt
"disgust" towards those politicians who "justify by their actions any feeling the
Japanese might have against us, while at the same time refusing to take steps to
defend themselves against the formidable foe whom they are ready with such
careless insolence to antagonize." 206 The President could not understand how
politicians could risk antagonizing the Japanese while they were in the process
of defeating Russia.
In other correspondence, Roosevelt complained about the "foolish
offensiveness" of the "idiots" in California who insulted the Japanese when the
whole nation would bear the costs of a war.20 7 In March 1905, the California
legislature passed a resolution asking Congress to prohibit the immigration of
"immoral, intemperate, quarrelsome men bound to labor for a pittance. 20 8 This
resolution was directly aimed at Japanese immigration, and its language
seemed designed to infuriate the Japanese. Roosevelt complained that the
"idiots of the California legislature" were doing "exactly the reverse of what I
have made the cardinal doctrine of my foreign policy. That is to say, they talk
offensively to foreign powers and yet decline ever to make ready for war. 20 9
Roosevelt believed one should "speak softly and carry a big stick," while the
California legislature and the California delegation in Congress insisted on
aggressive rhetoric without supporting the expansion of the Navy that
Roosevelt believed was necessary to protect the nation and prevent a war with
Japan. Aside from refraining from anti-Japanese rhetoric and state laws,
204

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, May 15, 1905 reprinted in 2

SELECTIONS

at 122.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan (May 6, 1905), in 4 LETTERS, supra

note 192, at 1168-69.
208 Id. at 1169 n.2.
209
Id. at 1169.
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Roosevelt believed the best way to avoid a war with Japan was to "keep our
navy so strong and so efficient that we shall be able to handle Japan if the need
ever arises."2 10
During the crisis over San Francisco's attempt to segregate Japanese
school children, Roosevelt told the American ambassador to Japan to reaffirm
to the Japanese government that neither the Roosevelt administration nor the
American people had "the slightest sympathy with the outrageous agitation
against the Japanese., 2 11 He assured Japanese officials that he would do
everything in his power to "protect the rights of the Japanese" in the United
States.212
Unfortunately for Roosevelt (and the American people), the nature of
American federalism complicated Roosevelt's foreign policy. He could not
control California or prevent that state from passing laws and ordinances which
violated the treaty with Japan. At best, he could take actions in the courtswhich eventually he did-to challenge California's actions. He told Baron
Kentar6 Kaneko, Japan's Minister of Justice, that one of the "disadvantages" of
the American system was "in dealing with movements like this," but that he
had already directed the Department of Justice "to see if we cannot remedy the
matter thru the courts. 21 3
The flip side of federalism, however, was that Roosevelt was free to
publicly and privately criticize the authorities in California. Thus, in his letter
to Baron 214
Kaneko he compared the actions of "these people in California" to
"pirates.,
In public, Roosevelt chastised authorities in California for their
segregation policies, calling them a "wicked absurdity" noting that "there are
no first-class colleges in the land, including the universities and colleges of
California, which do not gladly welcome Japanese students and on which
Japanese students do not reflect credit.' 215 In private, he was furious, writing
his son Kermit, a student at Harvard at the time: "I am being horribly bothered
about the Japanese business. The infernal fools in California, and especially in
210

Id.

211

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Lloyd C. Griscom (July 1, 1905), in 4

LETTERS,

supra

note 192, at 1274-75.
212 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Baron Kentar6 Kaneko (Oct. 26, 1906), in 5 LETTERS,
supra note 144, at 473. Kaneko had met Roosevelt in 1889 and both had been involved in the
negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War. After 1906, he was a member of Japan's Privy
Council. Roosevelt and Kaneko had been students at Harvard University in the 1870s at the same
time but had not known each other then. See generally MARIus B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF
MODERN JAPAN (2002); MASAYOSHI MATSUMURA, NICHI-Ro SENSO TO KANEKO KENTARO: KoHo
GAIKO NO KENKYU (Japanese ed. 1996).
213 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Baron Kentar6 Kaneko (Oct. 26, 1906), in 5 LETTERS,

supra note 144, at 473.
214
Id.
215 President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), in 15 RICHARDSON,
supra note 184, at 7054.
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San Francisco, insult the Japanese recklessly, and in the event of war it will be
the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences. ' 16 Eventually
Roosevelt convinced leaders in California to rescind the rule segregating
Japanese students, but by then the rupture of Japanese-American relations was
clear.
The State Department, following Roosevelt's lead, did everything it
could to shore up relations with Japan. On October 23, 1906, Secretary of State
Elihu Root told the American ambassador in Tokyo to communicate to the
Japanese government that "the United States will not for a moment entertain
the idea of any treatment of the Japanese people other than that accorded to the
people of the most friendly European nations ....
,,27
Roosevelt's response was more than just verbal. He dispatched
Secretary of Commerce and Labor Victor Metcalf, a former Congressman from
California, to San Francisco to investigate three things: "first, the exclusion of
Japanese children from the San Francisco schools; second, the boycotting of
Japanese restaurants, and, third, acts of violence committed against the
Japanese.,218 The report detailed violence against Japanese immigrants and
citizens, including Japanese scientists who had come to California to help the
state in the wake of the 1906 earthquake.2 19 Metcalf's report noted that there
were very few Japanese children in the public schools and they posed no threat
to any non-Japanese children in the city. Roosevelt told the Senate that his
administration had already instituted legal action to prevent the segregation of
Japanese children in the schools. 220 Ever the politician and reflecting his motto
to "talk softly," Roosevelt asserted that California authorities "assured
Secretary Metcalf that everything possible would be done to protect the
Japanese in the city,

'221

but reflecting the other part of his motto, Roosevelt let

California authorities know that he was also prepared to "carry a big stick."
Thus, the report noted that
I authorized and directed Secretary Metcalf to state that if there
was failure to protect persons and property, then the entire
power of the Federal Government within the limits of the
Constitution would be used promptly and vigorously to enforce

216
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt (Oct. 27, 1906), in 5
note 144, at 475-76.
217
AKAGI, supra note 164, at 433-34 (quoting Secretary of State Elihu Root).

218

LETTERS,

supra

VICTOR HOWARD METCALF, JAPANESE IN THE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., S. Doc. No.

147 (2d Sess. 1906). In December 1906, Roosevelt moved Metcalf to a new position in his
cabinet, making him Secretary of the Navy.
219
Id.
220

Id. at 17; see also letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Baron Kentar6 Kaneko (Oct. 26,

1906), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 144, at 473.
221 S.DOC. No. 147, at 2.
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the observance of our treaty, the supreme law of the land,
which treaty guaranteed to Japanese residents everywhere in
the Union full and perfect protection for their persons and
property, and all the forces of the United States, both civil and
military, which I could lawful employ, would be employed. 222
To this end, Roosevelt directed the Senate to the final sentence of
Metcalf s report:
All considerations which may move a nation, every
consideration of duty in the preservation of our treaty
obligations, every consideration prompted by fifty years or
more of close friendship with the Empire of Japan, would unite
in demanding, it seems to me, of the United States Government
and all its people, the fullest protection and the highest
consideration of its subjects. 223
Indeed, Secretary Metcalf suggested that the United States send troops to San
Francisco to protect Japanese immigrants.2 24
viii.

TOWARD RESTRICTION AND EXCLUSION

In his annual message of 1906, President Roosevelt urged Congress to
pass laws allowing the naturalization of Japanese immigrants.22 5 Under existing
law, only people who were "white" or of African ancestry could be
naturalized. 26 However, this did not happen. Despite his claims of support of
the Japanese, his disgust at the behavior of the Californians, and his fear that
insulting Japan would undermine international relations, in the end, Roosevelt

222

Id.

223

Id. at 17.

224

Id. There is an obvious parallel here with President Eisenhower sending troops to enforce

school integration in 1957. See generally TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER V.
AARON AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2007).

225

President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906) in 15 RICHARDSON,

supra note 184, at 7053.
226
AKAGI, supra note 164, at 434. Some Courts ruled that Middle Easterners-Syrians,
Lebanese, Armenians-were white, while others ruled the other way. Courts generally held that
people from India were not white. Nor were Japanese, whatever their actually skin color might
appear to be. An early example for is a lower court decision in Massachusetts denying
naturalization to Shebata Siato on the grounds that he is a member of the "Mongolian race." In re
Saito, 62 Fed. 126 (C.C.D. Mass., 1894); see also Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925)
(denying naturalization for a Japanese immigrant who had served in the United States Navy in
World War I); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that someone from India
could not be naturalized); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that someone
from Japan, whose skin was "light" was not white under the law). See generally HANEY LOPEZ,
supra note 58, at 203-08.
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conciliated the "idiots" in California 227 who insulted Japanese immigrants and
more importantly, the Japanese nation.228 But, instead of pushing for
citizenship for Japanese immigrants, Roosevelt signed the Immigration Act of
9
1 9 0 7 ,22

which authorized him to prohibit immigrants from coming to the

United States when such immigration would work "to the detriment of labor
conditions" in the United States. 230 This law also allowed the President to
prohibit immigrants initially destined for any "insular possession of the United
23
States" or any foreign country from entering the continental United States. '
The law did not require that such immigrants be banned, but instead gave the
President full discretion to implement these measures. These provisions of the
law were aimed at Japanese who moved first to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii (an
"insular possession of the United States") and then migrated to the United
States.232 Shortly after he signed this law, President Roosevelt issued an
executive order prohibiting "citizens of Japan or Korea, to-wit: Japanese or
Korean laborers, skilled and unskilled, who have received passports to go to
from being allowed "to enter the continental
Mexico, Canada or Hawaii" 233
territory of the United States.,

After this, Roosevelt opened negotiations with the Japanese
government to dramatically limit Japanese immigration into the United States,
which led to the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. Despite his high regard for
the Japanese, Roosevelt concluded that he needed to curb Japanese immigration
to keep the peace in California. He was concerned that the level of Japanese
immigration was growing despite earlier agreements by Japan to reduce
immigration.234 Thus, Roosevelt's administration negotiated the final
Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908.
Under the agreement, Japan agreed to limit the type and number of
visas it issued to its citizens coming to the United States.235 These limitations
included denying visas to "laborers, skilled or unskilled" unless they had
previously lived in the United States or were the "parents, wives, or children

227

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan (May 6, 1905), in 4 LETTERS, supra

note 192, at 1168-69.
Id.
228
229

An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, ch. 1134, § 1, 34 Stat.
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230 Id.
231
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233
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See RAYMOND A. ESTHUS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND JAPAN 105 (1967).
65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao Hanihara to
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under 20 years of age" of such laborers.236 The agreement allowed for tourists,
students, and merchants to come to the United States.237 The agreement also
allowed for family reunification, which meant wives and children could move
to the United States to be reunited with a husband or a parent.2 38 This led to
what was later termed "picture brides"-women who married husbands while
in Japan through a proxy system and then were given an exit visa by the
Japanese government to enter the United States.239
The agreement allowed Japan to appear to be an equal partner in the
development of American immigration policy. By declaring that Japan would
voluntarily restrict emigration to the United States, the agreement did not
appear to be forced on the Japanese. But this was a face-saving device. With
the exception of China, no other nation in the world had been forced to limit
how many of its citizens could move to the United States. Caving in to the
racism of the "idiots" in California, the United States effectively browbeat
Japan into voluntarily accepting its status as a second-class nation whose
citizens were unworthy of moving to the United States.
IX. THE DIPLOMATIC IMPACT OF THE BAN ON JAPANESE IMMIGRATION

In 1908, the governments of Japan and the United States completed the
final negotiations of the informal, non-binding "Gentlemen's Agreement" to
limit Japanese immigration to the United States. The goal of this agreement
was to resolve disputes over immigration and the status of Japanese immigrants
in the United States without resorting to formal legislation or treaties. The 1908
agreement replaced a less successful one developed in 1900. Under the 1908
agreement, Japan promised to voluntarily restrict Japanese immigration to the
United States while the administration of Theodore Roosevelt promised to
protect the rights of Japanese immigrants and their children living in the United
States.240 While reducing some tensions between the two nations over these
issues, the Gentlemen's Agreement formed a rocky foundation for relations
between the United States and Japan. Usually relegated to a footnote in

65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes); see also Inui, supra note 235, at 188.
237
65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes); see also Inui, supra note 235, at 188.
238 65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes); see also Inui, supra note 235, at 188.
239 65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes); see also Inui, supra note 235, at 188.
240
65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924) (correspondence from Ambassador Masanao
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes); see also Inui, supra note 235, at 188.
236
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American history-and even less than that in the field of immigration law-the
241
Gentlemen's Agreement deserves greater attention.
Under the first Gentlemen's Agreement of 1900, as noted above, Japan
exit visas to common laborers seeking to migrate
to stop issuing
had promised
et U
o n tted24
2
to the United States. But Japan had continued giving common laborers exit
visas for Hawaii, whose labor was vital for the expanding sugar industry on the
Islands. However, the 1900 agreement was relatively ineffective. After a short
dip in immigration in 1901, the number of Japanese entering the country rose to
new levels in 1902 and continued rising until 1909.243 In addition, a significant
number of Japanese migrated to Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico and then
eventually moved on to the United States.
The failure of the first Gentlemen's Agreement in 1900 led to
legislation in 1907 aimed at stopping this remigration.244 Under the new law the
president was given discretionary power to prohibit immigrants, like the
Japanese, from entering the United States through a third country, such as
Mexico or Canada, or through American territories like Hawaii or the Canal
Zone.2 45 While this statute successfully reduced the number of Japanese
coming to the United States by way of Canada, Mexico, and elsewhere, it did
not reduce the number of Japanese directly entering the mainland United States
or coming indirectly through Hawaii, in part because ships from that American
territory were not considered to be of foreign origin when they docked in the
United States. More importantly, the new rules failed to placate the deep
hostility to Japanese immigration in California. While millions of people from
southern and eastern Europe poured into the United States-including
significant numbers to Califomia-large numbers of people in the Golden State
remained adamantly opposed to the relatively small numbers of Japanese
coming into their state. Their hostility manifested itself at the official level in
anti-Japanese laws, resolutions, and regulations, including a resolution by the
San Francisco school board to segregate Japanese children in public schools. At
the unofficial level, this hostility led to boycotts of Japanese businesses,
destruction of property owned by Japanese, and violent attacks on Japanese
visitors and immigrants.

Oddly, there was no official published text of the agreements. Buell, supra note 3, at 631.
241
For a statement on where the unofficial agreements can be found, see supra note 3.
242
See supra Part VII.
243
ESTHUS, supra note 234, at 129, 150. In 1900, just over 12,600 Japanese arrived, this
dipped to 5,269 in 1901 when the first Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect, but then rose to
14,270 in 1902. From 1903 to 1909 over 100,000 Japanese immigrated to the United States.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL, supra note 76, at 567.
244
Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134 § 1, 34 Stat. 898 (1907) (regulating the immigration of
aliens into the United States).
245 Id.
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These acts and events, while taking place mostly in California, had farreaching consequences because they undermined United States foreign policy
and violated an 1894 treaty with Japan granting Japanese immigrants the full
and equal protection of American law.246 As noted above, initially, President
Roosevelt attempted to protect Japanese rights and allow for Japanese
immigration. This was in part due to his deep respect for the Japanese people"What wonderful people the Japanese are!" he wrote in 1905 247-and also to
Roosevelt's belief that antagonizing Japan would undermine American foreign
policy and possibly lead to war. Roosevelt's own Secretary of State, Elihu Root
supported the president on this issue with strong legal arguments, asserting that
California's actions "clearly violated the treaty of 1894, '' 248 and thus under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, California's laws were
unconstitutional. 249 However, in response to virulent anti-Japanese agitation in
California, Roosevelt eventually abandoned his support for the rights of
Japanese immigrants and pushed for a new diplomatic understanding, which
led to the final Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908.
Under the 1908 Agreement, the Japanese government voluntarily
restricted the number of exit visas it gave Japanese citizens migrating to the
United States, and promised to deny exit visas to common laborers trying to
enter the United States.2 50 The result was a sudden and dramatic decline in
Japanese migration to the United States. In 1907, 30,226 Japanese entered the
United States, but only 3,111 came in 1909, when the Agreement was fully
implemented.25' In 1910, Japanese immigration dropped to 2,720.252 Some
scholars assert that after the agreement, "Japanese migration into California
peaked in 1907 and then began a long decline. 2 53 But, the issue was in fact far
more complicated. Supporters of this claim are obviously correct that
immigration from Japan peaked in 1907 with over 30,000, and it bottomed out
in 1910 at 2,720. But thereafter, Japanese immigration into the United States
rose steadily, passing 6,000 in 1912, passing 8,000 in 1913, and passing 10,000

246 The most conspicuous hostility to Japanese immigration was in California, but other
western states, including Oregon, Washington, and Idaho passed hostile legislation. See, infra
note 296 for subsequent statutes limited in the rights of Japanese in other states. Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation, supra note 167.
247 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice (Mar. 19, 1904), in 4
LETTERS, supra note 192, at 759-61.
248
ESTHUS, supra note 234, at 139.
249

Id.

250

See generally Inui, supranote 235.

251

HISTORICAL STATISTICS,

supra note 6, at 58.

252 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL, supra note 76, at 567.
253

LAKE & REYNOLDS, supra note 127, at 177 (citing BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING

ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY,
STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL, supra note 76, at 567.

1850-1990, at 207-12 (1993)). HISTORICAL
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in 1918.254 Indeed, more Japanese immigrants came to the United States in
1918 and 1919 than in all but seven pre-Gentlemen's Agreement years. 255 This
contrasts, for example, with the massive decline in Chinese immigration
following the Exclusion Act. Thus, Chinese immigration dropped from 39,579
in 1882, on the eve of the Chinese Exclusion Act, to 279 in 1884, when the act
was fully implemented, and remained below 5,000 a year until 1924.256 Indeed,
Japanese immigration dramatically surpassed Chinese in every year from 1900
to 1924.257
Economic pressures in Japan and the United States undermined the
unenforceable agreement. Japanese citizens still wanted to come to the United
States, despite hostile state laws and growing anti-Japanese sentiment, and at
the same time, employers in California, Hawaii, and elsewhere in the United
States (especially the West Coast), wanted to hire them.258
In the Immigration Act of 1924, the United States unilaterally
abrogated the Gentlemen's Agreement, over the protest of the Japanese
government, by prohibiting all Japanese immigration. 259 This law did not single
out Japan for special adverse treatment. Instead, the law provided that no
immigrants could come to the United States if they were "ineligible for
citizenship. '260 Because Japanese were not "white ' 26 1 or of African ancestry

supra note 76, at 567.

254

HISTORICAL STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL,

255

Id.

256

Id.

257

Id.

258

On the increasing hostility to Japanese in California, see POLITICS OF PREJUDICE, supra note

3. One example of California's pernicious, but creative, racism was the Alien Land Law of 1913
(officially known as the Webb-Haney Act), which prevented "aliens ineligible for citizenship"
from owning agricultural land or leasing such land for more than three years at time. For an early
discussion of this law, see Edwin E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1947). This law was struck down in Oyama v.
California,332 U.S. 633 (1948).
259 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (an "Act to Limit the Immigration of
Aliens into the United States, and for Other Purposes").
260 Id. On the Japanese protest, see Statement of Ambassador Masanao Hanihara to Secretary
of State Charles Evans Hughes, 65 Cong. Rec. 6073 (1924). The 1924 law provided for a quota
for general immigration from every nation in the world. However, the law barred the immigration
under the quota system of persons who were "ineligible for citizenship." Immigration Act of
1924, ch. 190 §§ 13 (c), 28 (c), 43 Stat. 153, 162, 168. Because American law did not allow the
naturalization of Asians, Japanese and Chinese could not come into the United States under the
quota. The law did allow wives, children, and parents of American residents and citizens to enter
the country. From 1924 until 1941, a total of about 6,300 Japanese entered the United States.
Contrast this with the 8,800 who entered just in the year 1924 (before the quota system went into
effect) or the 30,000 who entered the year before the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect.
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, MILLENNIAL, supra note 76, at 567-68.
261
See HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 58.
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(the only categories of people who could be naturalized) 262 they were de facto
excluded from moving to the United States.
The events that preceded the final Gentlemen's Agreement-including
the San Francisco school segregation ordinance-were deeply humiliating and
hostile to the Japanese government and Japanese immigrants. The Gentlemen's
Agreement itself was essentially one sided and inherently insulting to Japan. In
1900 most Japanese believed "America was a friend." 63 But the racist state
legislation directed at Japanese immigrants passed by the California legislature,
the unpunished vigilante attacks on them, and the humiliation of the
Gentlemen's Agreement altered Japanese attitudes towards the United States.
After the negotiations over the Gentlemen's Agreement, most Japanese no
longer believed that "America was a friend."
As such, the final Gentlemen's Agreement was the first step in the long
decline in relations between the two nations which culminated in the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor and the devastating war that followed. The Gentlemen's
Agreements, especially the second one of 1908, illustrate the corrosive effects
of racism and discrimination on both foreign and domestic policy and support
the arguments of some legal scholars that racial bias that has long affected
American immigration and naturalization rules. 264
From a constitutional perspective, the final Gentlemen's Agreement
also underscores how federalism can endanger the nation and disrupt foreign
policy. The negotiations that led to the 1908 Gentlemen's Agreement began in
response to a decision by the San Francisco school board to segregate Japanese
children in the public schools. The Japanese government correctly saw this
action as deeply insulting to the Japanese people and argued that this decision
by a local school board violated the 1894 treaty between the two nations.265
The actions of the San Francisco school board illustrate one of the great
problems of the American constitutional system. In the early part of the 20th
century the regulation of both race relations and public education were
inherently state matters.2 66 (A century later, of course, the regulation of public
education still remains largely in the hands of local and state officials.) Thus, in
1906, the national government could not easily undo the damage to
international relations caused by the racism of the authorities in San Francisco.
Federalism thus undermined and complicated diplomacy.

262 Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254 16 Stat. 254 (1870) ("An Act to Amend the
Naturalization Laws, and To Punish Crimes Against the Same, and for Other Purposes").
263
LAKE & REYNOLDS, supra note 127, at 175.
264

See Chin, supra note 98; Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights, and Coalitionsfor

Social Justice, 1 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 181 (2003).
265 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, supra note 167.
266

See, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); see also Finkelman, Civil Rights

in HistoricalContext, supra note 169, at 973-1027 (discussing the development of segregation);
Finkelman, OriginalIntent and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 169, at 1019-63.
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As Roosevelt had explained to Baron Kaneko, American federalism
made it difficult for the national administration to easily respond to the actions
of the states and local governments which were passing anti-Japanese laws.267
When negotiations with California authorities failed, Roosevelt's
administration sued the school board. 268 This cumbersome method of enforcing
the treaty was hardly suited for quickly ending San Francisco's policy. In
March 1907, after meeting with President Roosevelt, the San Francisco school
board rescinded its rule for Japanese and Japanese-American children. 269 By
this time though, relations between the two nations had been severely damaged
and the "dismay, frustration and ultimately anger" the Japanese felt toward the
United States would not be easily undone.270 There are modem corollaries to
this problem. 27 1 Thus, for a variety of reasons, revisiting the Gentlemen's
Agreement offers us some historical perspective on the modem world, which is
complicated by racial and ethnic diversity and competition. The history also
sheds light on the "disadvantages," as Roosevelt called them, of a United States
constitutional structure that is hamstrung by a system of federalism developed
more than two centuries ago. This history also points out the very real dangers
to the nation stemming from state-based discrimination against aliens that
impinges on national immigration policy. The school segregation in San
Francisco, the California alien land laws, and the constant anti-Japanese
agitation in California and elsewhere led to a massive deterioration in United
States-Japanese relations that ultimately set the stage of war between the two
countries.
x. THE ULTIMATE COSTS OF ANTI-JAPANESE POLICY
Theodore Roosevelt began his presidency with a strong sense of what
might be called fairness in immigration, tainted by common racist notions of

267

Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Baron Kentar6 Kaneko (Oct. 26, 1906), in 5

LETTERS,

supra note 144, at 473; see also ESTHUS, supra note 234 at 139-47, 167-68. There are obvious
parallels to modem issues of immigration law today. State statues purporting to enforce federal
immigration laws often run in conflict with national policy. See, e.g., Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051,
invalidatedby Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
268
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Baron Kentar6 Kaneko (Oct. 26, 1906), in 5 LETTERS,
supra note 144, at 473.
269

AKIRA IRIYE, FROM NATIONALISM TO INTERNATIONALISM: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

1917, at 201 (1977) [hereinafter FROM NATIONALISM TO INTERNATIONALISM]; see also
Buell, supra note 3, at 631.
270
FROM NATIONALISM TO INTERNATIONALISM, supra note 269, at 201; see also Buell, supra
BEFORE

note 3, at 631.
271
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (discussing the State of Texas refusing to
follow United States treaty obligations to inform the Mexican embassy when a Mexican national
was arrested by state authorities).
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the age. Thus, he endorsed restrictions on Chinese immigrants and others "who
are ignorant, vicious, and with low standards of life and comfort .... ,,272 At the
same time, early in his presidency, Roosevelt supported Japanese immigration
and at one point urged Congress to allow for the naturalization of Japanese
aliens. These sentiments are in part tied to Roosevelt's respect for the Japanese
that came from his friendship with Baron Kaneko. Roosevelt and Kaneko had
been classmates at Harvard, although they had not met at that time. 73 But, by
the time he became President, Roosevelt knew and respected Kaneko and thus
understood that the Japanese could be the "right sort" 274of immigrants. He also
gained great respect for the Japanese during the Boxer Rebellion and the
Russo-Japanese War. During his negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War,
he told a confidant that "I thoroughly admire and believe in the Japanese. They
have always told me the truth, and the Russians have not., 275 His respect for
Japan was tied to his fear that poor relations between the two nations might
lead to war. And as a famous soldier and military hero, he, in part, admired the
Japanese because "they have the kind of fighting stock I like. 276 Thus, his
immediate response to the anti-Japanese agitation in California was anger and
frustration at the "foolish offensiveness" of the "idiots" and the "infernal fools"
in California.2 77
By the end of his presidency and in his post presidential years,
Roosevelt's ideology shifted from seeking cooperation and peace, toward
displaying his "big stick" in an attempt to cow the Japanese. In 1905 and 1906,
he instinctively understood that insulting the Japanese and increasing tensions
between the two nations was not in America's best interest. Indeed, as one
scholar has noted, the school segregation crisis would "leave such ugly
memories on both sides of the Pacific that the cordiality that had characterized
previous relations could never be fully recovered., 278 But, he began to move
away from his smart diplomatic instincts. Thus, he sought to intimidate the
Japanese when he sent the Great White Fleet across the Pacific to impress the
Japanese with America's military power. At the same time, he aggressively

272

ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note

273

See

158, at 244.

MASAYOSHI MATSUMURA, BARON KANEKO AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
(1904-05):

A STUDY INTHE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (Ian Ruston trans., 2009).
274

Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), in 15 RICHARDSON, supra note

184, at 7007.
275 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan (1905), in ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 158, at 273.
276

Id.

277
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan (May 6, 1905), in 4 LETTERS, supra
note 192, 1168-69; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt (Oct. 27, 1906), in 5
LETTERS, supra note 144, at 475-76.
278 ESTHUS, supra note 234, at 128.
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pushed for the second "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908 that was neither
gentlemanly nor much of an agreement.
Part of the reason for this ultimate result-and Roosevelt's about face
on seeking harmonious relations with Japan-was the failure or inability of the
national government to adequately respond to the racism in California.
Federalism, political considerations, and Roosevelt's unwillingness to use all of
his power to confront California left him unable to recover the high level of
friendship and cooperation that he had built while negotiating an end to the
Russo-Japanese War. Secretary of State Root believed that California's actions
"clearly violated the treaty of 1894, ' ' 29 and thus under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, he thought the federal government had a legal duty, a moral
right, and a constitutional obligation to intervene to protect Japanese rights.
But, racism, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on segregation, and
Roosevelt's own political values took him elsewhere.
Roosevelt initially told the Japanese he would do everything necessary
to protect their rights, and the Japanese responded warmly. After Roosevelt's
1906 message to Congress suggesting that the naturalization laws be extended
to Japanese immigration, Baron Kaneko told the President that Japanese
editorials "showered upon you all the praises they have in store.', 280 But, within
a year, Roosevelt had squandered this good will by caving in to the racist
demands of California to end Japanese immigration. Moreover, he no longer
seemed to care about getting along with Japan because, as he told his Secretary
of State, "we have the navy in good shape." 28'
By 1913, in the wake of his unsuccessful attempt to regain the
presidency, 28 2 Roosevelt had also abandoned his previous respect for the
Japanese and no longer recognized the differences between Japanese
immigrants and those from China. He noted the "strong feeling in California
against the immigration of Asiatic laborers," and agreed this was
"fundamentally a sound and proper attitude, an attitude which must be insisted
upon., 283 He still argued that this policy should be carried out with a "sense of
279

Id. at 139.

280

Letter firom Kentar6 Kaneko to Theodore Roosevelt (Dec. 1, 1906), in ESTHUS, supra note

234, at 147.
281 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root (July 13, 1907), in 5 LETTERS, supra note
144.
282
Roosevelt did not run for reelection in 1908, and instead supported Secretary of War
William Howard Taft. But in 1912, Roosevelt opposed Taft for the nomination and after being
denied the nomination by the Republican Party, Roosevelt ran as a third party candidate on the
Progressive Party, more commonly known as the Bull Moose Party. His running mate was Hiram
Johnson of California, who supported the anti-Japanese movement in California. Roosevelt ran
second in the popular vote and the electoral vote, with the incumbent President Taft running
third. See 2 JAMES T. HAVEL, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTIONS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL GUIDE 99 (1996).
283

ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 158, at 244.
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mutual fairness and reciprocal obligation and respect as not to give any just
cause of offense to Asiatic peoples, 284 even though he surely knew that the
policies he had developed in his last few years in office would certainly lead to
"offense." Two years later he extolled the virtue of "[t]ravellers, scholars, men
engaged in international business, all sojourners for health, pleasure, and study"
being "heartily welcomed in both countries," but had now thoroughly rejected
immigration, arguing that "[f]rom neither country should there be any
emigration28 5of workers of any kind to, or any settlement in mass in, the other
country."

It would be too much to blame the subsequent total deterioration of
Japanese-American relations on the San Francisco school segregation
ordinance, Gentlemen's Agreements, or later laws in California such as the
alien land law. Later immigration policies surely were even more important not
only in international affairs, but also in the domestic sphere. In 1922, in Ozawa
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Japanese immigrant could not
be naturalized because he was not "white," as required by the 1870
Naturalization Act.286 The Immigration Act of 1924 constituted a unilateral
abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, because "persons ineligible for
citizenship"--such as the Japanese-were unable to immigrate under the new
quota system.287 Congress did take this action openly, by simply banning
Japanese immigration. Instead, the Congress did it indirectly by banning
immigrants "ineligible for citizenship" and relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ozawa v. United States to ban Japanese immigrants by implication.
Ironically, in 1901, the U.S. Industrial Commission had said the Japanese were
"as a class tricky, unreliable, and dishonest. ' 288 But, in the 1924 Immigration
Act, it was the U.S. Congress that was "tricky" and "dishonest." The Japanese
government was furious over this unilateral abrogation of existing diplomatic
relations. 289 The Japanese understood that Congress and the President had
deeply insulted them by, in effect, saying they were unfit to migrate to the
United States.

284

Id.

285

Id. at 273 (Originally published in The Metropolitan (Mar. 1915)).

286

See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that Japanese were not "white"

and thus could never be naturalized citizens even though Ozawa was "well qualified by character
and education" to become an American citizen); see also Yuji Ichioka, The Early Japanese
Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa Case, reprintedin 2 ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE LAW 397 (Charles McClain ed., 1994). The Court reaffirmed this analysis in
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), holding that a person from India was also not
"white" for purposes of immigration.
287 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, §§ 13(c), 28(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162, 168 (repealed 1952).
288
289

TENBROEK ET AL., supra note

105, at 23-24.
On Japanese reaction, see 65 CONG. REc. 6073-74 (1924); see also Inui, supra note 235, at

188.
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The ultimate collapse of United States-Japanese relations was of course
also a function of Japanese imperial designs in China and the Pacific. Even
before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, United
States-Japanese relations were close to the breaking point. Japanese aggression
in Asia, including the Japanese annexation of Manchuria, the invasion of
China, and the horrendous slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians and
captured Chinese troops in the "rape of Nanking" in late-1937 and early-1938
had fatally destroyed United States-Japanese relations. 29 By this time, Japan
was intent on totally dominating east Asia and the western Pacific, and short of
a change in Japan's political leadership, war between the United States and
Japan was virtually inevitable.
However, if the United States had treated Japan as an equal in the
world, by implementing a less racist foreign policy, it might have diminished
Japanese fears, reduced the aggressive and imperialistic policies of Japan, and
could have even improved relations to the point where war between the two
nations was less likely to occur. A different American policy might even have
altered Japan's internal politics. We can only wonder if events would have been
different if there was fair trade, robust commerce, and friendly relations
between the two nations, along with the decent treatment of Japanese citizens
living in the United States and a non-racist immigration policy. On the other
hand, while the American immigration policy was deeply insulting to the
Japanese, it surely did not justify Japan's imperial moves in the 1930s, the
slaughter of at least a million civilians in China, and the attack on Pearl Harbor
in 1941. But, a different American policy might have set the stage for a less
aggressive Japan and enabled the two nations to peacefully negotiate their
differences.
By the 1930s, more than two decades of racist policies pursued by
various presidents, Congresses, and many state legislatures-and approved by
the Supreme Court-made any understanding between the two nations difficult.
Leadership from the executive branch and different legislation in Congress
would have gone a long way towards redirecting Japanese-American relations.
On the other hand, American federalism, and the weakness of the federal
government made it impossible for the national government to totally reign in
the states. As California, Oregon, and other states pursued their own racist
policies toward Japanese immigrants and their children-developing what
might be considered their own state immigration policies-they forced the

290

After the fall of Nanking, the Japanese slaughtered thousands of captured Chinese soldiers,

murdered some 20,000 young men and boys in the city, raped tens of thousands of women, and
ultimately murdered at least 200,000 Chinese civilians and probably as many as 370,000 or more.
See IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR 11 (1997);
see also The Rape of Nanking or Nanjing Massacre (1937), PACIFICWAR.ORG,
(last visited
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/JapWarCrimes/TenWarCrimes/RapeNanking.html
Apr. 10, 2015).
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United States into a relationship with Japan that helped push both countries
towards war.
A different jurisprudence by the Supreme Court might also have altered
the trajectory of Japanese-American relations. In Ozawa v. United States,29' the
Supreme Court interpreted the federal law to exclude naturalization of East
Asians on the ground that they were not "white." This of course was a highly
subjective categorization. From his skin color, Ozawa looked "white," and
surely had lighter skin than some Europeans, Mexicans, or Middle Easterners
whom the courts did consider "white." A different jurisprudence on race would
have altered the politics of the immigration laws and certainly would have been
more respectful of the Japanese. Similarly, the Court's support of segregation at
the state level only encouraged the racists in the California legislature to
increase their attacks on Japanese immigrants and their children. Significantly,
William Howard Taft-who had been Secretary of War when the Gentlemen's
Agreement was negotiated-was the Chief Justice when the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled against Japanese naturalization in Ozawa.2 92 In 1925, the
Court also denied naturalization to Hidemitsu Toyota, who came to the United
States in 1913 and served in the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy during World
War I. Federal law allowed honorably discharged veterans to immediately
claim citizenship. The federal court in Massachusetts granted him citizenship,
but the United States government appealed and the Supreme Court reversed
this ruling. 29To
his credit, Chief Justice Taft dissented, but no other justice
3
joined him.
A more enlightened American immigration policy in 1908 and 1924
might have led to very different relations between the two nations. The
Gentlemen's Agreement was insulting to the Japanese, who were essentially
told that they were not "good enough" to move to the United States. The
unilateral abrogation of the Agreement in the 1924 Immigration Act was a
direct, and unnecessary, assault on Japanese pride. Under the 1924 Act many
nations received the minimum quota of 100 immigrants per year. 294 Had Japan
received this quota, there would have been no perception of insult. But Japan
was denied any immigrants under the quota system, through the faqade of
banning all aliens "ineligible to citizenship. 2 95
It is also possible that if the United States had developed a different
immigration policy before 1908, Japan itself might have been fundamentally
changed. Instead of viewing the United States as a hostile rival, the Japanese
might have seen America as a good friend, welcoming Japan into the world
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community as a full and equal partner. This, in turn, might have altered the way
Japan viewed the United States and the rest of the world. It might also have
altered Japanese domestic politics and allowed the nation to veer away from its
catastrophic journey to war under Toj o.
In addition to the immigration policy, the racism of California and
other states also exacerbated tensions in international relations. Following the
Gentlemen's Agreement, California and other states passed laws to restrict
Japanese land ownership.29 6 Reflecting the views of most easterners, the
Hartford Times [Connecticut] recognized that such actions were detrimental to
the entire nation, noting that "of the two, it might be cheaper to go to war with
California than with Japan., 297 In addition to restricting land ownership, the
western states found other ways to limit the ability of Japanese to participate in
regulated economic activities. 298 These laws clearly undermined the nation's
ability to work with Japan in the international setting.
The decline in Japanese immigration after 1908 also had adverse longterm consequences for the Japanese-American community. The arbitrary
limitation on Japanese immigration slowed the growth of the JapaneseAmerican community and made it less able to resist the discriminatory
legislation after 1908. Inthe long run, these immigration policies also left the
Japanese community on the West Coast unable to fend off the internment of
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right to practice law in Washington State on the grounds that Japanese born immigrants could not
be citizens of the United States, and the State of Washington made citizenship a perquisite for
admission to the bar. Not all states had such a requirement); see also In re Hong Yen Chang, 24
P. 156 (Cal. 1890) (stating that California would not admit to the bar a Chinese immigrant even
though he had been admitted to practice in New York). In 1943, California also prohibited
Japanese immigrants from obtaining commercial fishing licenses. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (overturning California law denying commercial fishing licenses
to "persons ineligible for citizenship," which applied almost entirely to Japanese born aliens).
The State of Washington prohibited aliens who had not declared their intention to become
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MURRAY, STATES' LAW ON RACE AND COLOR 491-503 (University of Georgia Press 1997)
(1951).
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1942. Had Theodore Roosevelt, the Congress, and the Supreme Court stood up
to the bigots in California, it is likely that the Japanese-American population
would have been much greater in 1942 and better integrated into the society.
Had the land laws (and other restrictions on Japanese economic development)
been struck down, the Japanese-American community would have been in a
stronger position and less vulnerable to the racist forces that led to the
Internment. This might have prevented the wholesale incarceration of the
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast, 299 and instead of an interment
program, it would have resembled the targeted and selected policy carried out
in both Hawaii and the mainland against those Germans and GermanAmericans who were legitimately seen as threats to the nation's security.
However, in 1941 and 1942, Japanese-Americans were politically weak
and economically vulnerable. When the war began, California's leaders
defended the loyalty of the much larger Italian-American community in
California and elsewhere, and successfully opposed interning Italian
nationals-such as the parents of Joe DiMaggio who lived in San Francisco but
had never bothered to learn much English or become citizens. 300 Similarly, no
one considered incarcerating the Italian-American mayor of New York,
3
Fiorello LaGuardia, or his counterpart in San Francisco, Angelo J. Rossi. 01
Nor did anyone imagine the government should monitor such GermanAmericans as General Dwight D. Eisenhower or Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,
who were two of three men to command a theater of operations during the
War.30 2 When Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
planning and coordinating the Allied invasion of Europe (the Normandy
landing), no one suggested he was a security threat, or that his GermanAmerican family in the United States was a security threat. 3 3 But, reaching
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back to a long tradition of hostility to the Japanese in California, the
Congressional delegation from that state was able to push policies and
legislation that led to the internment of some 120,000 elderly Japanese aliens
and their American-born children, who were citizens of the nation. 4
Without the Agreement of 1908, the path that ultimately led to Pearl
Harbor and the devastation that followed, might have led to a different
destination. In 1900, as the Japanese intellectual Inazo Nitobe noted, even the
peasants in Japan "were aware that.. . America was a friend., 30 5 The diplomat
Viscount Tadasu Hayashi "declared fulsomely that Japan regarded America as
its benefactor. 30 6 But, the school segregation crisis and the treatment of
Japanese immigrants as a pariah race-at a time when millions of less-educated
Europeans were pouring into the United States-set the two nations on a course
for conflict. A different legal resolution to both issues might have
fundamentally altered Japanese-American relations and internal Japanese
attitudes toward the United States, discouraging anti-American Japanese
militarism and imperialism in the 1920s and 1930s, and leading to peaceful
resolutions of conflicts between the two nations.
Even if conflict between Japan and the United States had eventually
taken place, a different immigration and naturalization policy might have still
led to a better outcome on the home front. A larger, more integrated, and more
politically successful Japanese-American community would have been less
vulnerable to the racism leading to the internment. Thus, with a different policy
in 1908 and beyond, it is likely that Japanese-Americans, and the whole
American nation, might have fared better after Pearl Harbor. Ironically, when
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066,37 interning almost all
Japanese-Americans, he was following a path created by his distant cousin who
had pushed for the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1907 and 1908. The
circumstances of the internment-the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the
war that followed-are also rooted in these events of the early 20th century.
They also provide lessons for Americans of today as Congress debates
immigration policy and some states try to develop what amounts to their own
foreign policy and immigration policy.
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